

THE PROBLEM OF NORTHERN IRELAND AS A CASE STUDY OF FIRST
WORLD NATIONALISM

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the challenges presented by ethnic movements in the first world to the sovereignty rights of nation-states. Modern states, that erased the former identities of their native populations, saw with the termination of the Cold War, the resurrection of those past identities, claiming self-determination. Some movements were successful in seceding and establishing new states. Whereas some other ethnic movements reached accommodations with power devolution mechanisms. However those that have not been able to achieve both, experienced continuous ethnic strife in the political sphere. The thesis explores the Northern Irish case as a First World nationalism that has not been able to achieve either. The Irish case is analyzed in order to identify reasons behind the existence and emergence of First World ethnic nationalisms.

Key Words: Northern Ireland, Fragmentation, First World

ÖZET

BİRİNCİ DÜNYA MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİNE ÖRNEK OLARAK KUZHEY İRLANDA SORUNUN İRDELENMESİ

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Bu çalışma birinci dünya ülkelerinde ulus devletlerin egemenlik hakkına başkaldıran etnik hareketleri incelemiştir. Modern devletler kökünü kazıdıkları etnik kimliklerin, soğuk savaşın sona ermesini takiben self-determinasyon talepleri ile ortaya çıktıklarına tanık oldular. Bu cereyanlardan bir kısmı ayrılmak ve yeni devletler kurmak konusunda başarı göstermişlerdir. Bir kısmı, egemen merkezi yönetim ile düzenlemeler yaparak uzlaşma yolunu seçtiler. Bu iki amaca da ulaşamayan hareketler ise sonu gelmez etnik çatışmalar ile boğuşup durdular. Bu tez Kuzey İrlanda sorununu bu iki sonuca da ulaşamamış bir "birinci dünya milliyetçiliği" örneği olarak incelerken, halen birinci dünyada varlığını sürdürmekte olan diğer milliyetçiliklerin nedenlerini belirlemek amacına yöneliktir.

Anahtar Kelimeler:Kuzey İrlanda,Parçalanma,Birinci Dünya.

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1800		Act of Union signed between Britain and Ireland.
1845		Beginning of potato blight, which becomes known as the Great Famine, 1845-49. Nearly a million perish and another million emigrate, mainly to the US, Canada and Australia. Over the next fifty years the Irish population is halved, due mainly to emigration, from over 8 million in 1841 to 4.5 in 1901.
1858	17 March	Foundation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, also known as the Fenians, led by James Stephens in Ireland and John O'Mahoney in USA.
1870		Home Government Association formed under Isaac Butt to campaign for return of self-government to Ireland.
1879		Land League formed by Michael Davitt and Charles Stewart Parnell.
1881	January	Fenian Bombing campaign in England, sponsored by the American Arm of the Fenians, the Clan-na-Gael. The bombings continue intermittently until 1887.
	April	Land Act introduced following widespread agitation on the land organized by the Land league.
1886		First Home Rule Bill defeated in House of Lords.
1907		Sinn Fein formed under the leadership of Arthur Griffith.
1912		Third Home Rule Bill passed.
		Ulster Volunteer Force formed to oppose imposition of home rule.
1913		Irish Volunteers formed to resist threat from UVF.
		Irish citizen Army formed by James Connolly.
1914		Outbreak of First World War.
		Irish Volunteers split over attitude to First World War with majority following call of John Redmond to enlist in British Army, leaving smaller group under Eoin Macneil opposed to involvement in the war.
1916		Easter Uprising in Dublin.
	May	Leaders of Rising, such as Patrick Pearse and James Connolly, executed.
1917		Eamon de Valera elected President of Sinn Fein.
1919	21 January	Dail Eireann formed. Two policemen killed at Soloheadbeg, Co. Tipperary, signaling the start of the Anglo-Irish war.
1920		Attacks on police and army by units of Irish Volunteers, increasingly known as the IRA.
		British introduce Auxiliaries and 'Black and Tans' to support security forces.
	December	Government of Ireland Act provides Northern Ireland with its own assembly and government at Stormont.
1921	7 July	Northern Ireland parliament convenes.

	11 July	Truce declared between British and IRA.
	6 December	Anglo-Irish Treaty reached between British and Irish delegations.
1922	7 January	Dail approves Anglo-Irish Treaty, 64 votes to 57.
	March	IRA splits into pro- and anti-Treaty factions.
	April	Anti-Treaty IRA or 'irregulars' set up headquarters at four Courts in center of Dublin.
	June	The pro-Treaty party, Cumann na n Gaedhal, win large majority in elections to the first Irish Free State parliament.
	28 June	Free State forces attack IRA Irregulars at Four Courts, signaling start of Irish Civil war.
	October	Free State government introduces severe measures to curb IRA violence.
1923	27 April	IRA orders ceasefire bringing civil war to a close.
1926	16 May	De Valera and some of his colleagues in Sinn Fein split from the anti-Treatyites to form Fianna Fail.
1927	12 August	Fianna Fail deputies enter Dail for the first time.
1931	October	Free State outlaws IRA.
1932		Fianna Fail wins general election. De Valera becomes Prime Minister.
1933	9 September	Fine Gael Party formed out of old Cumann na nGaedheal.
1936	June	De Valera government declares IRA illegal.
1937		New Constitution changes name of Free State to Eire and claims territorial jurisdiction over Northern Ireland.
1939	12 January	IRA ultimatum threatens to declare war on Britain unless its forces withdraw from Northern Ireland.
	16 January	IRA begins bombing campaign in England.
1940	January	Irish government passes Emergency Powers Act to intern IRA suspects.
1948		A Fine Gael/Clann na Phoblacta coalition wins power from Fianna Fail.
		Irish government declares the country a full republic.
		British government passes Ireland Act in which Northern Ireland's position in UK guaranteed so long as the Stormont parliament wishes.
1956	11 December	IRA launch border campaign against Northern Ireland.
		Northern Ireland government introduces internment.
1957	March	Fianna Fail returned to power in Irish general election.
	July	De Valera introduces internment in Irish Republic.
1959		Sean Lemass replaces de Valera as Irish premier.
1963	March	Terence O'Neill becomes Prime Minister of Northern Ireland.
1966		Series of UVF killings -organization declared illegal in Northern Ireland.
1967	January	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association formed.
1968	August	First Civil Rights march from Coalisland to Dunganon.

1969	January	Civil Rights march from Belfast to Derry attacked by loyalist crowd at Burntollet Bridge.
	28 April	Terence O'Neill replaced as Northern Ireland Prime Minister by James Chichester-Clark.
	12-14 August	Severe rioting in Bogside, Derry.
	14 August	British troops sent onto streets of Derry.
	December	Extraordinary IRA Convention approves ending of abstention. Opposition delegation form PIRA Army Council.
1970	11 January	Split between Official and Provisional wings of IRA confirmed at Sinn Fein Ard Fheis when a third of delegates opposed to the ending of abstention walk out of to form Provisional Sinn Fein.
	1 April	Ulster Defence Regiment formed to replace RUC B Specials.
	July	Curfew imposed by British Army on Lower Falls Area of West Belfast.
	21 August	Social Democratic and Labor Party formed.
	October	PIRA begins sustained bombing campaign, mainly against commercial targets.
1971	20 March	James Chichester-Clark resigns as Northern Ireland Prime Minister and is replaced by Brian Faulkner.
		Ulster Defence Association is formed.
1972	30 January	Parachute regiment shoot dead thirteen men during a civil rights demonstration in Derry, incident becomes known as 'Bloody Sunday'.
	22 February	Official IRA bomb kills seven people at Parachute Regiment's headquarters in Aldershot.
	20 March	Six people killed by PIRA car bomb in Donegall Street, Belfast.
	24 March	Stormont parliament suspended. Direct rule from Westminster introduced. William Whitelaw appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
	20 May	OIRA announces ceasefire.
	14 June	WhiteLaw grants special category status (political status) for prisoners convicted of paramilitary offences.
	22 June	PIRA announces ceasefire.
	1 July	UDA erects 'no-go' areas in loyalist districts to match those in nationalist areas of Derry and Belfast.
	7 July	PIRA delegation meets William WhiteLaw in London. Nothing is agreed.
	9 July	Ceasefire collapses over PIRA claims that British Army have broken truce during incident at Lenadoon, West Belfast.
	21 July	Nine people killed in PIRA bombing assault in Belfast, the incident becomes known as 'Bloody Friday'.
1973	8 March	Border poll in Northern Ireland produces large vote for staying in UK.
	December	Sunningdale Conference agrees to establish a Power sharing executive for the province.

1974	January	Power Sharing Executive takes office under leadership of Brian Faulkner. Immense unionist objections to Executive, especially to Council of Ireland.
	15 May	Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike aimed at bringing down Power Sharing Executive.
	28 May	UWC strike causes collapse of Power Sharing Executive.
	4 July	Secretary of State, Merlyn Rees, announces the setting up of a constitutional Convention to work out a new form of devolved government for the province.
	10 December	PIRA announces a ceasefire to run from 22 December to 2 January 1976.
1975	16 January	PIRA calls off ceasefire.
	10 February	PIRA suspends operations against security forces after new ceasefire negotiated. Incident centers set up by PSF to monitor ceasefire and liaise with Northern Ireland Office.
	1 May	Polling takes place for Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention.
1976	1 March	Special category status ended for those convicted of paramilitary offences.
	9 March	Northern Ireland Convention dissolved after failure of participants to agree on a form of power sharing.
	September	Protest in Maze Prison against the ending of special category status begins.
1977	3 May	Loyalist strike launched as protest against the British government's security policy and to demand return of majority rule in Northern Ireland.
	13 May	Loyalist strike called off after failing to rally support and in face of the British government's determination to resist striker's demand.
1979	5 May	Humphrey Atkins made new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland following election of Conservative government on 3 May.
1980	7 January	Constitutional conference convened at Stormont to debate forms of government for the province.
	27 October	PIRA prisoners in Maze prison begin hunger strike to demand the restoration of political status.
1981	5 May	Bobby Sands dies on the hunger strike causing widespread rioting in Belfast and Derry.
	13 September	James Prior becomes Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
	3 October	Hunger strike called off after ten republican prisoners in all have died.
1982	April	James Prior issues White Paper on proposal for 'rolling devolution' Assembly which would agree on measures of self-government for the province.
	20 October	Voting takes place for 'rolling devolution' Assembly. PSF gain 10.1 per cent of the vote in Northern Ireland

1983	9 June	British general election. PSF gains 13.4 per cent of the vote and Gerry Adams wins the seat of West Belfast. The Unionist parties win fifteen seats and the SDLP one seat.
	13 November	Gerry Adams elected PSF president.
1984	10 September	Douglas Hurd appointed new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
	12 October	PIRA bomb planted at Grand Hotel, Brighton, explodes during Conservative Party Conference. conservative Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, narrowly escapes death, five others killed.
1985	20 May	Local government elections - PSF wins 11.4 per cent of vote in the province and fifty-nine seats.
	2 September	Tom King becomes new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
	15 November	Irish Prime Minister, Garret FitzGerald, and Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, sign Anglo-Irish Agreement at Hillsborough, Co. Down.
	23 November	Large Loyalist demonstration held in Belfast to protest at Anglo-Irish Agreement.
1986	26 February	Loyalist day action against the Anglo-Irish Agreement causes widespread disruption to most areas of the province.
	29 May	Tom King announces that Northern Ireland assembly will be dissolved.
	2 November	PSF Ard Heis votes to end abstention from the Leinster House parliament in the Irish Republic. The vote causes some former PSF members to break away to establish Republican Sinn Fein.
1987	19 February	In general election in the Irish Republic, PSF gain 1.9 per cent of the vote and fail to win a seat.
	12 June	In British general election PSF gains 11.4 percent of the vote in Northern Ireland. Gerry Adams retains his seat.
1988	January	PSF - SDLP talks begin, end of talks on 2 September.
	19 October	Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, announces restrictions on the broadcast of interviews with members of paramilitary organizations and their supporters.
1989	January	PSF president, Gerry Adams, publicly cautions PIRA over increasing number of civilian deaths caused by its operations.
	17 May	Local elections in Northern Ireland sees PSF win 11.3 per cent of vote.
	16 June	In general election in Irish Republic PSF gain only 1.2 per cent of the vote.
	24 July	Peter Brooke becomes new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
1991	7 February	PIRA mount mortar attack on Downing Street, London, while (Gulf War) War Cabinet is in session; no one is injured.
	30 April	Inter-party talks on the political future of Northern Ireland involving the constitutional parties get underway in Stormont.

	3 July	Following protracted procedural difficulties the inter-party talks in Northern Ireland.
1992	10 April	Westminster General Elections, the Conservative government of John Major elected. In Northern Ireland PSF's votes declines to 10 per cent. Gerry Adams loses the seat of West Belfast
	11 April	Sir Patrick Mayhew appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
	6 July	Political talks among the constitutional parties in Northern Ireland opened at Lancaster House in London.
1993	11 April	John Hume, leader of the SDLP, and PSF president, Gerry Adams, meet each other in the first of a series of meetings, which become known as the "Hume-Adams" talks.
	15 November	Gerry Adams, president of PSF, reveals that his party has been in prolonged talks with the British government.
	15 December	The British and Irish governments announce a joint statement on Northern Ireland, known as the Downing Street declaration.
1994	11 January	The Irish government lifts the Republic's broadcasting restrictions on PSF.
	9 March	PIRA launch mortar attack on Heathrow airport, London.
	5 April	PIRA begins three-day ceasefire in order to facilitate clarification of the Downing Street Declaration.
	13 May	PSF submits questions for clarification to the Irish government.
	19 May	Northern Ireland Office publishes response to PSF's lists of clarification questions.
	24 June	PSF conference in Letterkenny, Co. Donegal, rejects key sections of the Downing Street Declaration.
	31 August	PIRA announces indefinite ceasefire.
	13 October	The Combined Loyalist Military command declares a ceasefire.
1995	7 March	Northern Ireland Secretary, sets out the conditions for Sinn Féin to join all-party talks,
	September	David Trimble takes over from James Molyneaux as leader of the Ulster Unionist Party.
	24 November	The British and Irish governments launch 'twin-track initiative' (preparatory talks and the establishment of an international body to oversee decommissioning and other matters).
	30 November	US President Bill Clinton visits Belfast, Derry and Dublin.
1996	24 January	The international body proposes six principles of democracy and non-violence as conditions for entry to all-party talks ('the Mitchell principles').
	9 February	The IRA ends its ceasefire by bombing South Quays, London
1997	31 October	Mary McAleese is elected President of the Republic, succeeding Mary Robinson.
	1 May	Tony Blair's Labor Party wins a big victory in the UK general election; Mo Mowlam becomes Northern Ireland Secretary.
	20 July	The IRA institutes a second ceasefire.

	9 September	Sinn Féin subscribes to the Mitchell principle; some hard-line Republicans quit the Provisional IRA in protest.
	7 October	'All-party' negotiations commence.
	27 December	The Loyalist Volunteer Force leader Billy Wright shot dead in the Maze prison, seven Catholics killed in revenge by Loyalist paramilitaries.
1998	January-March	The Ulster Democratic Party and Sinn Féin are suspended from the talks at different times because of their associates' violence.
	10 April	The Good Friday Agreement is negotiated by most of Northern Ireland's political parties and the British and Irish Governments.
	22 May	The Good Friday Agreement is endorsed in referendums North (71%) and South (94%).
	15 August	The 'Real IRA' kills 28 people in a bomb attack in Omagh, Co. Tyrone.
	16 October	John Hume and David Trimble awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
1999	2 December	The end of direct Westminster rule in Northern Ireland: a devolved government takes office, with David Trimble (UUP) as First Minister and Seamus Mallon (SDLP) as Deputy First Minister; other ministers are from the UUP (3), the SDLP (3), the DUP (2) and Sinn Féin (2). The DUP ministers refuse to attend cabinet meetings while Sinn Féin ministers are present.
	2 December	The Irish government replaces Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, the British government repeals the Government of Ireland Act 1920, the IRA appoints an intermediary to enter discussions with the decommissioning body headed by General John de Chastelain.
2000		The Good Friday Agreement has a difficult year, with varying degrees of deadlock on the decommissioning, demilitarization and policing issues. The Provisional IRA, notwithstanding its ostensible ceasefire, is responsible for numerous 'punishment' attacks and 'expulsions'. The 'Real IRA' and 'Continuity IRA' continue their terrorist campaigns having imported arms from Croatia.
2001	7 June	Elections in Ulster.
	8 June	Irish voters rejected the treaty of Nice.
	1 July	David Trimble resigned from the power-sharing government because of the deadlock on decommissioning of arms.
	3 August	Real IRA bomb attack in London center.
	14 August	PIRA announced that it has annulled the ceasefire.

Sources:

-Smith. M.L.R. 1995. *Fighting For Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*. London: Routledge.

- A Timeline of Irish History

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INTRODUCTION

The second half of the twenty-century has seen the emergence of nation-states that have freed themselves from their former occupiers and took their place in the international community as 'sovereign states'. That period which was accepted as the period of decolonization created an environment of hope for the new emerging states. It was thought, that by replicating the countries labeled as the "First World", they could acquire the same levels of economic, social and political development. However, in the course of time the newly formed entities had some major problems that were threatening to break them into parts, or had already broken them into a number of states. This process, which continued during the Cold war era, reached even a greater level with the end of the Cold war (Hannum, 1998).

Nonetheless, what was differing from the previous experiences was that as a surprise of most, in the last decade, the fragmentation processes was not limited to Third-World countries but was experienced by the leading developed countries as well. Prior to the fragmentation experiences in developed countries, those events were considered as major symptoms of processes of misintegration, or the failure of the modernization project. After the ferocious events that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia into a multitude of states, as well as the breakup of the Russian empire and more recently the NATO intervention of Kosovo, a set of ethnic theories were developed to satisfy the need to understand the *raison d'être* of those brutal separations. Another aspect of the fragmentation process related with the first world was the re-emergence of identities

that were considered as lost, forgotten. Those were thought of having been erased in the cultural homogenization process of the enlightenment-guided nation-states, experienced a resurgence in the form of sub-regional claims for self-determination ranging from autonomy to regional independence. A factor leading to those structures is the threat that the nation-states are experiencing faced with the globalization of the economy, a slow but relentless act that can lead to the dismemberment of the modern state. What is more, there is the formation of arrangements that encompass the nation-states such as the European Union project that will materialize with the usage of one currency, the Euro. Although not new, the Northern Ireland issue has persisted from the beginning of the twenty-century until the present. What makes the Northern Ireland case interesting is that it is located in the Northwestern part of Europe, where the first nation states emerged, and the industrial revolution started. Briefly, as O'Sullivan (1986) used saying that it is a "first world nationalism," and that makes it useful for to pursue the understanding of the persistence or re-emergence of ethnic affiliations on the Western block.

The first chapter will consist of theories that will establish the basis of the ensuing analyses. In the first chapter, the aim will be at first to show how the modern state came into existence. What were the historical consequences that helped its formulation and what are its consequences? Second, the challenges to the nation-state will be given in a detailed manner to provide an accurate understanding of the events that are threatening the existence of nation-states. Within that, the reasons for ethnic challenges will be explained, as well as the meaning of ethnicity in the identity-

shaping process, and finally how the link between ethnicity and nationalism was formed. Third, the basic sociological approaches to ethnic nationalism will be given in order to build the theoretical framework in which the analysis of Irish affairs will be dealt with. Lastly theories of secession will be dealt with separately from the other theories. These answer the justification for making a claim to secession will be analyzed.

Accordingly, the second chapter will focus on the origins of the Irish problem. It will concentrate on the British occupation, and the results that it created. Second the colonization of Ireland by foreign forces, with the immigration of a massive population that brought a new religion, which is be the most important basis of the crisis. Third, the interaction between the members of two different religions, especially violence that is used to create differentiation among the population will be studied. Fourth, the significance of the Orange Order for the native Irish population, its leading role in creating a common cause for Protestants will be explained. Fifth, the expectation of emancipation of the Catholics by constitutional ways, the “Home Rule” experience, and its effect upon Irish nationalism will be given. Lastly, the birth of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the military branch of the Irish Catholic emancipative experiment will be analyzed.

Chapter three will be about the Northern Irish problem after World War I. At first, the socio-political developments will be given since that period coincides with the Irish rebellion attempt, and an attempt to form an independent state apart from Britain.

Second, the Anglo-Irish treaty that formally created the Free Irish state and the civil war that was fought in order to form that state will be explained. Third, the emergence of the Ulster Republic and its repressive policies, with respect to its Catholic minority through the formation of an apparatus that will systematize the discriminatory policies of the Protestants. Fourth, the ways in which that repressive apparatus was legitimized and how the state consolidated itself will be discussed. Fifth, the challenges that the Southern part of the island had to experience in order to evolve into the Irish republic from the Irish Free State which was dependent on the British Crown will be given. Sixth and last, the impact of the Second World War will be reviewed.

Chapter Four will deal with the issue of decolonization and its effect on the Northern Ireland question. At first the peculiarities of that period will be given. Second, that period will be analyzed in accordance with the British decolonization and the Commonwealth issues. Succeedingly, the problems of Northern Ireland after the war will be analyzed.

Chapter Five will deal with the structural changes in Northern Ireland in the 1970s. At first, the effects of the economic environment that are reflected on the politics of the Republic of Ireland will be introduced. The oil crisis of the 1970s and the fluctuations in international markets and their effect on the Irish economy will be given to show its impact on the political system of Ireland. Second, the admission of Ireland to the European Economic Community, and its reflection on the Northern Ireland issue will be shown. Third, the Irish-British relations and their improvement that have created

differences on the issue of Northern Ireland will be demonstrated. Lastly, the beginning of the armed struggle of the IRA and the political side of the armed struggle will be explained.

CHAPTER I

THEORIES OF NATION BUILDING

Nowadays the nation-state is under serious challenges. Groups aim to change, to undermine the status of unitary nation-states, and bring national fragmentation onto the agenda. The concept of fragmentation has a large scope, and ranges from decentralization and autonomous administration to secessionist claims. For a better understanding of the fragmentation process, the basic tenets of the nation-state, especially its ways of deriving its legitimacy will be shown; then, after changes in the political and social environment, which helped to speed up the process of fragmentation, will be dealt. Lastly with the help of the theories of secessionism, developed throughout the last years, factors causing the re-emergence of regional loyalties and resurgence of sub-national territorial claims in the areas considered, as the “First World” will be explained *in extenso*.

1.1 The Nation State and its Formulation

Keating argues that “Nationalism is a doctrine of self-determination”(1996:1), important nation-building process. Nationalism should not only be understood as a form of politics, argues Breuilly (1994), since it can only be applicable in a particular political context, it has also the aim to establish that special context to promote its

own objectives. The climax of the nationalist project can only be achieved by the establishment of the modern state. Benedict Anderson (1991) finds that one of the pillars of the modern state, the nation, is a cultural construction whose meaning has created controversies¹. Therefore Anderson defines the nation as an “imagined political community” that is “limited” and “sovereign”.

The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm ...Finally it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. (Anderson, 1991: 7)

Anderson claims that what made possible the emergence of these “imagined communities” by superseding “the imagined community of Christendom” was an “interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print) and the fatality of human linguistic activity” (1991: 43). The convergence of capitalism and print technology paved the way for a new form of imagined community that transformed itself to the modern nation. The emerging *bourgeoisie* acquired a national character since it operated within a “pre-existing framework of ethnic communities and states that were frequently locked in rivalry and warfare”(Smith, 1991:166). At first, merchants and later industrial capitalism increased the level of competition. Resulting in wars that glued the nation and the territorial unitary state, the contribution of the expanding capitalist system was

¹ Theorists of nationalism have often been perplexed, not to say irritated, by these paradoxes: (1) the objective modernity of nations to the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists. (2) The formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept –in the modern world everyone can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality, as he or she has a gender- vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations, such that, by definition, ‘Greek’ nationality is *sui generis*. (3) The ‘political’ power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence. See Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities*.

“to strengthen the existing inter-state system in Europe, and through its wars and rivalries to help the process of crystallizing national sentiment in the state’s dominant *ethnie*”(Smith, 1991: 166). Hall (1996) argues that a nation is not only a political community but also an entity that produces meaning, “a system of cultural representation”. National culture is important in providing symbols of identity for it creates guidelines of communications and means of interpreting social reality in a society (Keating, 1996). Common language can be shown as an example of a mechanism, which enables the individual to participate in the civic life since it serves to integrate in the society.

National history and culture are the tenets of national discourse². According to Keating (1996) the nationalist ideology has led to the construction of civic values since the “legitimacy” was driven within the rules of the newly born “liberal democracy,” which required a certain level of participation by its citizens. So this framework, the development of popular sovereignty, has led to the development of the representative institutions, which was the most important element in the development of liberal democracy. Breuilly (1994) also suggested that the nature of the modern-state has necessitated a specialized kind of political leadership in a civil society in order to reclaim needs from the state for various projects.

² Keating quotes Mill saying: “This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race or descent. Community of language, and community of religion, greatly contributes to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But strongest of all is identity of antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.” See Keating, Michael. 1996. *Nations Against the State*.

Another important point is how the model of imagined communities was constructed. Hall (1996) shows that five types of narratives were used for that aim. First, the “narrative of a nation” is repeated in national history, literature, media and popular culture. “These provide a set of stories, images, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and rituals which stand for, or represent, the shared experiences, sorrows and triumphs and disasters which give meaning to the nation” (Hall, 1996: 613). Second, emphasis is given to “continuity, tradition and timelessness” (Hall, 1996) by creating a national identity that serves many purposes.

Perhaps the most important of its functions is to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of personal oblivion. Identification with the ‘nation’ in a secular area is the surest way to surmount the finality of death and ensure a measure of personal immortality...Even more important, it can offer a glorious future similar to its heroic past. In this way it can galvanize people into following a common destiny to be realized by succeeding generations. But these are the generations of ‘our’ children; they are ‘ours’ biologically as well as spiritually, which is more than any class or Party can promise. So the promise of life immortal in our posterity seems genetically vindicated. (Smith, 1991:161)

Third, on re-inventing tradition³ by for example generalizing some local traits in the whole nation as a discursive strategy, fourth, by giving emphasis on foundational myths⁴ in an aim to propagate the idea of difference from other nations. Fifth and last, in some cases, national identity is also based “on the idea of the pure, original people or folk” (Hall, 1996).

³ Hall quotes Hobsbawn and Ranger. “The invention of tradition: Traditions which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented ... [means] ...a set of practices, ... of a ritual or symbolic nature which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviors by repetition which automatically implies continuity with a suitable historical past”. See Hall, Stuart .1996. *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*.

⁴ Foundational myth: a story, which locates the origin of the nation, the people, and their national character so early that they are lost in the minds of, not “real ” but “mythic” time. See Hall, Stuart .1996. *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*

Keating claims that nationalism serves as a mechanism to bridge the gap, which exists between the individual, created by the enlightenment and the collective area where the individual is embedded. “Nationalism thus functions as a civil religion, legitimating the political order, providing social cohesion and transcending ethnic and other particularistic differences” (1996: 13). Hall criticizes the discourse of national culture.

It constructs identities, which are ambiguously placed between past and future. It straddles the temptation to return to former glories and the drive to go forwards ever deeper into modernity. Sometimes national cultures are tempted to turn the clock back, to retreat defensively to that ‘lost time’ when the nation was ‘great’ and to restore past identities. This is the regressive, the anachronistic element in the national cultural story (Hall, 1996: 615)

The discourse of national culture shapes the formation of the nation-state. Keating argues that the term nationalism also referred to two type of nation-building methods, the ethnic and civic. “The ethnic theory of nation-building holds that nations are constituted by ethnic groups” (Keating, 1996: 3). In that model membership of the national community is accorded on the ascriptive criteria. “Civic nationalism” is a different mode of nation building. Individual agreement rather than ascriptive identity (birth, ethnic origin) is important in that model. Civic nationalism goes from the individual to the nation where individual rights and duties are derived from a common nationality. Since civic nationalism, which has a broader appeal than ethnic nationalism, lacks the emotive side of ethnic nationalism, both models are used in discourses depending of the audience and circumstances (Keating, 1996).

Each state has used the nationalist doctrine in order to prove that it is sovereign in a certain area that means that it has the ultimate authority within a territory, which has fixed boundaries. The national theory focuses on common aspects, which exist within

those boundaries, while at the same time it tries to show the differences lying outside the borders. The concept of the “other” is very important in the nationalist ideology -since a competition is supposed to exist within states- the state should have the monopoly of power within its territory to be able to not loose the competition.

Externally the limit upon sovereignty is set by the sovereignty of other states...internally the sovereignty of the state is limited...by the distinction between the public and the private spheres. In the public sphere the state exercises sovereignty directly; in the private sphere it does no more than provide ground rules for dealings between individual and groups...This idea of the state is marked by internal tensions between universality and particularity and between boundlessness and limitation...The state is universal in that was it envisaged is a world made up wholly of a number of such states. There should be no area or person not subject to the rule of the state (Breuilly, 1994: 369)

The citizens are subject to equal treatment as long as they belong to that nation. Smith argues that “to be legitimate in these terms a nation-state must show that its citizens are sharply differentiated from ‘foreigners’, but equally undifferentiated from each other internally, as far as it is possible”(1991:169). So a different identity that challenges the sole identity preconceived by the states in strong state tradition was seen as a failure against the outsiders and obstacle to the modern states’ goal, the idea of progress, which was taken from the enlightenment thinkers⁵. Toland (1993) criticizes the history of state building by saying that who have captured power have tried all manners to “eradicate ethnicity through genocide” by labeling them as “tribalism” or “discredit it with the mind frame of modernization,” or by not taking

⁵ Keating and Bartkus quoting from J.S. Mill: “Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton or a Basque of French Navarre to be...a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship... than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies for the Welshman or the Scottish highlander as members of the British nation”. See Keating, Michael. 1996. *Nations Against the State*. Also see Bartkus, Viva Ona.1999. *The Dynamic of Secession*.

those aspirations into account in daily national policies but rather “relegate it to local” level of politics.

Following the idea of progress, nationalism was also used in the economic arena in order to create unified and integrated markets within the nation states by attacking in the name of the common good the particular interests of guilds, towns and corporations. The state also used its means to develop and strengthen internal markets with policies, like tariff protection and promotion of trade. With the depression of the 1930s the state adopted protectionism against international competition. The state also used the economy as a device to build the nation internally. With state protectionism native capitalist and business classes were created, which have increased employment levels and ameliorated the situation of workers. With the rise of the nation-state, capitalists became increasingly national capitalists rather than local or international. The industrial *proletariat*, that was both internationalist and localist, and opposed protectionism by seeing it as a device to protect the interests of the employer, realized in the twentieth century that it had vested interests in the nation-state and acted in favor of protectionism as a means of defending jobs (Keating, 1996). The nation-state has led the creation of prosperity as a means of legitimizing itself by assuming wider responsibilities and adopting Keynesian policies. In those years “basic industries such as energy, transport, coal and steel were taken into public ownership”(1996: 32). Neo-corporatist policies that brought together the employer, the workers and the state created a ground for the state to consolidate its position *vis à vis* its internal enemies

since the state had obtained the opportunity to affect nearly all of the spheres of public life.

1.2 Challenges to the Nation-State

Since some environmental factors, which eased the way for the nation state, to strengthen and legitimize itself, have changed; the nation state now is threatened of losing its sovereignty in three dimensions (Keating, 1996). The first dimension which is called “from above” by Keating (1996) results from the economical change that the world experienced, the phenomenon that is called “globalization” threatens the *status quo* which existed since the French revolution. The nation-state owes its existence to the modern understanding of sovereignty. This theory was conceived for a world of independently dominant sovereign nation states, but nowadays with internationalization of the economy the ability of states to pursue economic policies through by-passing multinational corporations has decreased. The globe has witnessed plenty of changes since the Second World War. As Smith (1991) argues the 1970s and 1980s saw the relaxation of relations, that had reached incomparable levels of threat after World War II, between two power blocks; communism and capitalism. The bipolarity was relaxed with, at first, increasing political and economic forces of states such as West Germany, Japan, China; and second by the emergence of the European Economic Union and lastly by the impact of “*perestroika*” on the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. The emergence of transnational corporations, aided by the rapid growth of mass telecommunications, their ability to plan long-term strategies, and their presence on many continents coincided with the period of

relaxation, which resulted in the “formation of an international division of labor in which states with different levels of development are inserted, often through the operations of the transnational corporations”(Smith, 1991: 154). According to Keating (1996) the economic environment of competing states doesn't exist anymore since the economic corporations are not national anymore, as they changed their character from being national to transnational entities there appeared new allies and new enemies. Barnett and Cavanagh argue that the competition between the states continue but in a different manner:

The competition based in a handful of developed industrial nations to reach the affluent and the credit-worthy is so intense that issues of trade are becoming the national-security preoccupation of the 1990s. A world in which national purpose defined by global economic competition just as it was measured by territorial expansion is vulnerable to global economic warfare. The limits of the global market are pushing nations into economic and political conflict even as scarcity of living space and natural resources not so long ago pushed them into wars of conquest (1994: 176)

Nation-states have also lost the ability to control the private economic sector. States guided by economic change pursued the path led by transnational corporations, and formed blocks where new allies came together. This led to continental rapprochement and integration. There appeared models like North America Free Trade Association (NAFTA), an integration model where national governments are favored compared to the European Union model, where new institutions that have the ability to by-pass central governments gaining more and more power to deal with the internal affairs of the eroding nation state (Keating, 1996).

Economic necessities are compelling states to surrender parts of their sovereignty to supra-national organizations. The European Union is a good example: no longer do the parliaments of the member states have the powers, which they formally had. (Billig, 1995: 133)

Two basic arguments are used to legitimize the damage caused by transnational forces, which have created massive population movements and growing levels of environmental pollution throughout the globe. “The first claims that advanced industrial capitalism has given birth to giant economic and political units that render the ‘nation state’ obsolete”. (Smith, 1991:155) The agent of such obsolescence, it is argued by Smith (1991), is the emergence of giant corporations that acquired “complex computerized networks and package imagery” which make them very effective.

The second argument sees the supersession of the nation as part of the move to a ‘post-industrial’ society. While nations were functional for an industrial world and its technological and market needs, the growth of the ‘service society’ based on computerized knowledge and communications systems overleapt national boundaries and penetrated every corner of the globe. Only continental cultures, ultimately a single global culture, can fulfill the requirements of a post-industrial knowledge-based society. (1991:155).

The economic development and increasing levels of trans-national forces, and the increasing power of the supra-national institutions encourage, give incentives to the second level of challenge, which is called by Keating (1996) “from below”. This is the resurgence of loyalties that were assumed to disappear by the modernists; those are the sub-territorial movements, which differentiate themselves from the uniform understanding of the nation-states. These movements exert regional claims with varying degrees. Examples are the various peripheral nationalist movements which tried to decrease the capacity of their central governments. Billig says, “The very differences and attachments which the state sought to erase in its modernist quest for uniformity are now being revived. Some of these newly revived identities are constructed in the image of nationhood”(1995: 133).

In the space of little more than a generation, regional assertiveness has been felt in most of the countries of the EC. Whether in Scotland or Corsica or Catalonia, Lombardy, Flanders or the Basque country, the seamless and integral nature of the nation-state has been called into question, as regionalist movements have sought to shake off the more or less oppressive yoke of central control and to stake their claim to varying degrees of autonomy and regional self-expression. (Wagstaff, 1994:3).

Billig (1995) argues however, that those nations that succeed in achieving independence will not have the same opportunities, which the earlier sovereign states enjoyed; they will face challenges from supra-national organizations, as well as from the sub-national identities. They will be threatened by the same processes that helped them to create their own states.

The third level of challenge which is called by Keating (1996) “lateral pressures” is the result of the two dimensions. The national state loses its ability, the monopoly of mobilizing collective action since new forms of identifications are becoming more important than the former national identity, which become less important and useless in some cases. It is argued that identities are defined rather by consumption patterns than by national denomination (Billig, 1995).

The result is that the processes of globalization, which are diminishing differences and spaces between nations, are also fragmenting the imagined unity within those nations. The state, declining in its powers, is no longer able to impose a uniform sense of identity. With the pressure for national uniformity removed, a variety of other forces are released. Within the national territory, multiple narratives and new identities are emerging. Local, ethnic and gender identities have become the site for post-modern politics (Billig, 1995:132-133)

Keating argues (1996) that, the Single European Act (SEA) is the typical example of a treaty that undermines the center’s authority since the regions will have direct representation and say in the European Union (EU), by-passing the sovereign nation-

states. Billig (1995:141) on the contrary sees the EU as “some sort of permanent alliance and trading agreement between states, which jealously preserve their historical independence”. The issue of limiting migration shows that states have not evaporated and are still sovereign, since there is no free market of labor in the world. Also Barnett and Cavanagh believe that the nation-state is still the dominant unit of governance in the world, since:

The nation-state is far from disappearing. On the contrary, the Cold War victory has unleashed a revival of nationalism, a bloody nightmare in the Balkans that is a prototype of the national-security crises of the 1990s. Every ethnic group and religious faction, it seems, wants its own banner. National governments everywhere are getting bigger, but are neither more effective nor popular. (1994:20).

1.2.1 Re-emergence of Ethnic Challenge as a Fragmentary Force

Hannum (1998) signals that “ethnic conflict has replaced the Cold War as the primary interest of political and military theorists, and even conflicts that may be primarily political or economic in nature are frequently given an ethnic cast”. In effect, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were accompanied by new ethnic and national claims, since “about a dozen new ethnic wars erupted in the erstwhile Soviet empire between 1988 and 1992” (Gurr, 2000:2) and more than 24 wars started or finished in the same period in the southern part of the globe, most of them not directly related to the end of the Cold War. Gurr (2000) adds that the interventions in Kosovo and East Timor were only taken after long tentative of discussions aiming reconciliation with constitutional means, and when those failed, military intervention took place. The participation of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations, and Australia

was proof that ethnic management had become an international responsibility. Gurr (2000) claims that by the mid-1990s the number of ethnic groups using violence as a tool fell from 115 to 95 ⁶, and that between 1993 and the beginning of 2000; the number of wars for self-determination had decreased.

During the 1990s, 16 separatist wars were settled by negotiated peace agreements, and 10 others were checked by ceasefires and ongoing negotiations ...Less visible than the shift toward settling separatist wars is a parallel trend toward accommodating ethnic demands that have not yet escalated into armed conflict. Leaders of ethnic movements appeal to minorities' resentment about rights denied - political participation, autonomy, and cultural recognition (Gurr, 2000:2)

The reason for the decrease in violent confrontations is related to common decisions reached at the international level⁷. Protection of collective rights and democracy are the most important elements of the new preferred strategy for managing ethnic heterogeneity. According to Hannum (1998) ethnic wars of secessions reflect the tensions existing between “self-determination” and “sovereignty”, or “territorial integrity”. Although those agreements were reached at the international level, central authorities are distant towards autonomy since it can slip towards independence. Gurr (2000) points out that few negotiated autonomies produced independence.

⁶ But a more important indicator was the balance between escalation and de-escalation: of the 59 armed conflicts under way in early 1999, 23 were de-escalating, 29 had no short-term trend, and only 7 were escalating—including Kosovo. See Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. *Ethnic Warfare on the Wane*

⁷ The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe adopted standards in 1990-95 that prohibit forced assimilation and population transfers, endorse autonomy for minorities within existing states, and acknowledge that minority claims are legitimate subjects of international discussion at both U.N and European regional organizations. See Gurr, Ted Robert. 2000. *Ethnic Warfare on the Wane*

1.2.1.2 Ethnicity and Identity⁸

Brown (1993) uses the definition of Anthony Smith for ethnic groups. He thinks that a group should have six qualifications in order to be considered as an ethnic community.

First the group must have a name for itself...Second the people in the group must believe in a common ancestry...Third, the members of the group must share historical memories...Fourth, the group must have a shared culture, generally based on a combination of language, religion, laws, customs, institutions, dress, music, crafts...Fifth the group must feel an attachment to a specific territory, which it may or may not actually inhabit. Sixth and last, the people in a group have to think of themselves as a group in order to constitute an ethnic community; that is they must have a common sense of ethnicity (1993: 4-5)

Causes of ethnic conflicts are regrouped into a three level analysis by Brown: a- the systemic level; b- the domestic level; and c- the perceptual level. Brown argues that “Systemic explanations of ethnic conflict focus on the nature of the security systems in which ethnic groups operate and the security concerns of these groups” (1993: 6). Some conditions must be met for systematic analysis. The first condition is the coexistence of two ethnic groups in a certain environment. The second point for the analysis is the lack of a strong authority to provide security for both of the groups. In that case the groups have to work for their own defense. Also they can suffer from a “security dilemma” by “mobilizing or deploying military forces” which will treat the security of their counterparts. This dilemma can be experienced in two forms, if offensive and defensive forces are not distinguishable, or when the advantage of offensive acts surpasses the benefits of defensive acts. Brown (1993) argued that these

⁸ The title was taken from a sub-title from: Rupesinghe, Kumar .1996. *Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World*.

can be materialized in conditions of instant collapse of empires, where groups suddenly realize that they have to create their own defenses or that to attack is the way to defend the acquired benefits. Also “Windows of opportunity and vulnerability” is important in the analysis since that would be the result of different levels of military power as well as the formation of a state. Second, nuclear weapons are a major incentive to build stability. Therefore it is important in preventing “the windows of vulnerability to open up”. Domestic explanations can be summarized as “the effectiveness of states in addressing the concerns of their constituents, the impact of nationalism on inter-ethnic relations, and the impact of democratization on inter-ethnic relations” (Brown, 1993: 8). The basic needs of a population are security and economic development. It is argued that nationalism is the best remedy for the societies that experience insecure times⁹. So the emergence of ethnic nationalism is much more than a coincidence in disintegrating societies such as Yugoslavia. The emergence of ethnic nationalism fuels other ethnic nationalism, and confrontation becomes inevitable. The level of tension between ethnic groups is the principal denominator in future events. If the disintegrating regime was controlled by a minority ethnic group, the suppressed larger groups will try to take revenge. If the old regime had discriminated and used violence against the other *ethnie*, the new regime needs fewer changes to consolidate itself to a democracy. The second important point is the relative size ethnic groups in a country. “If one group is substantially larger than the others, then it is more likely that the majority group will be able to dominate

⁹ Brown quotes from Snyder: “By its nature, nationalism based on equal and universal citizenship rights within a territory depends on a framework of laws to guarantee those rights, as well as effective institutions to allow citizens to give voice to their views. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, depends not on institutions, but on culture.” See. Brown, Michael E. 1993. *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*

discussions about new political arrangements and that minority interests will be neglected” (Brown, 1993: 9). However, if opposition to the ruling ethnic group is achieved with the help of the other ethnic group that will eventually lead to fragmentation and the democratic experience will fail. Another important situation arises from sudden changes in which negotiations take place rapidly and the issue of ethnicity is neglected but power struggles channel into ethnic problems and democracy can fail. Another problem is the existence of political parties in multiethnic society that are based on ethnic differences.

When this happens, party affiliations are a reflection of ethnic identity rather than political conviction...under these circumstances, elections are mere censuses, and minority parties have no chance of winning power...In countries where parties are organized along ethnic lines and where winner-take-all elections are conducted...minorities remain essentially powerless, victims of a “tyranny of the majority”(Brown, 1993: 10)

What is more, in many countries existing minority rights are not applied although they exist theoretically. Perceptual explanations are false explanations about historical events; the ethnic conflict is interpreted by one group. Those are passed from generation to generation “by word of mouth”. “Distorted and exaggerated with time, these histories present one’s own group as heroic, while other groups are demonized” (Brown, 1993, p.11). A person socialized under these circumstances can easily be driven into the fight.

1.2.2. Defining Ethnic Groups and Nationalism

Two approaches, that give relevant explanations, competed; about the formation of an ethnic group and how it acquires the possibility to become a nation. Those were the

primordialists and the instrumentalists (Freeman, 1998a; Keating, 1996; O'Sullivan, 1986; Smith, 1995).

Primordialism, by emphasizing the strength and non-rational character of certain social ties, explains the persistence of ethnic bonds and their power to override other motives, especially those based on economic calculation. However. Its claim that identities and attachments are natural, ancient, prior to social interaction...has been refuted by sociological evidence. This shows that ethnic identities and attachments persist only as the result of continuing social interaction (Freeman, 1998a: 19-20)

Primordialism was reformulated after several criticisms, and the revised version has taken the family as the most fundamental human group. By that it is implied that humans are not only members of their biological families, but also “to a larger cultural collectivity, such as clan, tribe or nation...this is why community ties may seem sacred, ineffable and coercive. This is why individuals may be willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of the community” (Freeman, 1998a: 20). O'Sullivan (1986) states that our need to have an identity and self-esteem can only be nourished in collectivities where individuals met with each other. In the community the individual encounters and adopts a much larger identity than that of himself. Smith (1995) sees the extreme version of ‘primordialism’ as the one which claims that we have an ethnic identity as we have “sight, speech or smell”. “This form of primordialism regards human beings as belonging ‘by nature’ to fixed ethnic communities, in the same way that they belong to families” (Smith, 1995:31). The revised version of primordialism, takes ethnic groups and nations as “enlarged quasi-families¹⁰” (Freeman, 1998a).

¹⁰ Freeman quotes from Horowitz (1985:64) and Smith (1986: 24): Where ethnic group members believe that kinship and ethnicity are indistinguishable, because, for example, they subscribe to a myth of the common ancestry of the ethnic group, the self and the group are mutually incorporated in each other, and thereby the distinction between self-interest and self-sacrifice for the group is blurred, if not wholly eliminated. See Freeman, Michael .1998a. “Theories of Ethnicity, Tribalism and Nationalism in

Freeman (1998a) gives an example of violence that is condemned when applied within the group, but tolerated outside the group. The conception of ethnicity seen as extended kinship has major problems. One of the problems is in its cultural imbeddedness. A common culture that brings people together can help in differentiation, but also it is difficult to put a strict limitation on an ethnic group, defined in terms of a shared culture. Ethnicity can easily be manipulated by using myths and common memories. Territoriality is also used as an element of ethnicity but many cases have shown that changes in territorial boundaries can lead to different ethnic identifications (Freeman, 1998a). Sociobiology was another primordialist approach towards the explanation of ethnicity. According to this approach “ethnies and nations are ‘natural’, because they are extensions of kin groups which are selected by genetic evolution for their inclusive fitness”(Smith, 1995: 32). Sociobiologists used the theory of inclusive fitness taken from biology and applied to social sciences¹¹. Van den Berghe developed a theory that was a combination of sociobiology with social science in which the individual is at the core of the ethnic group as a “selfish maximizer”. The assumption of the theory is that ethnic behavior is shaped by the choices of the maximizing individuals who benefit from the outcome of those choices.

According to Smith the application of that theory is as follows:

Individual reproductive success is maximized by ‘nepotism’ as well as reciprocity, and cultural similarity is treated as an important means of guiding individuals in their quest for genetic reproduction through inclusive kin groups.

Ethnic Conflict, Tribal Politics” in *Ethnic conflict, tribal politics: a global perspective*. Kenneth Christie, ed.

¹¹ Freeman quotes from V. Reynolds, V. Falger and I. Vine: The theory holds that humans are genetically predisposed to ethnocentrism, because selection favors those groups whose members prefer their kin and who develop cultural (i.e., ethnic) markers to identify them. See Freeman, Michael .1998a. in *Ethnic conflict, tribal politics: a global perspective*. Kenneth Christie, ed.

The fact of biological origins of ethnic groups is reflected in their cultural myths of origin and descent (1995:32).

The theory has three major failures according to Freeman. The first point is that the individuals are selfish but are required to favor their group, rather than just themselves. The issue of maximization is another problem since the theory appeals to material interests but at the same time to religious beliefs and social status as a powerful motivator. Thirdly..

The theory assumes that selfish genes seek to reproduce themselves --rough kin selection. But it explains altruism only if selfish genes select altruistic kin ... However, the theory still fails to explain how selfish genes produces individual choices and how such choices produce altruism. (Freeman, 1998a: 20).

Freeman criticizes Van den Berghe's methodology as being too "reductionist, materialist; and individualist"; since he finds the definition of an ethnic group based on biology too narrow, and prefers to see them as culturally constituted. The proof for that is the capability of elites to mobilize ethnic groups for political ends, as well as to reform identities, and even form new ethnic groups and nations (Freeman, 1998a). A third version of primordialism also accepts the view that ethnicity is a given, powerful social bond. The emotional power of the ethnic bond is however not inherent in itself, but rather it is felt by the participants of the *ethnie* in encounters between them (Smith, 1995). "It is the members of participants that attribute a 'primordial' quality to their particular *ethnie*; in their eyes the ethnic tie has logical and temporal priority over other ties, and they acknowledge its compelling power and 'affect' " (Smith, 1995: 32).

Smith (1995) opposed the primordialist approach, and saw the nation-building process as a “continuing process, which may involve the destruction, incorporation, transformation or invention of putatively primordial groups”(Freeman, 1998a: 26). Also O’Sullivan (1986) argued that there is a strong psycho logic impulse in the formation of the ethnic groups that is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. “A group constitutes itself as ethnic because it is politically useful, not because the members feel any psychological bond. And ethnicity will be abandoned when it ceases to serve that instrumental purpose” (O’Sullivan, 1986: 4).

Briefly an ‘instrumentalist’ approach is one that regards human beings as having always lived and worked in a wide range of groups. As a result, people have a variety of collective identities, from the family and gender to class, religious and ethnic affiliations. Human beings are continually moving in and out of these collective identities. They choose, and construct, their identities according to the situations in which they find themselves. Hence, for instrumentalists, identity tends to be ‘situational’ rather than pervasive, and must be analysed as a property of individuals rather than of collectivities.(Smith, 1995:30)

As per O’Sullivan (1986) that without the conscience and conceptualization of a difference between ‘them’ and ‘us’, neither ethnicity nor race can exist. “These subjective perceptions do not develop at random, they crystallize around clusters of objective characteristics that become badges of inclusion or exclusion” (O’Sullivan, 1986: 4). A second important point is the concept of nationalism. According to O’Sullivan (1986) nationalism has two important aspects for nationalist movements. One is its mobilizing effect on a social group that wants to secure its own political, social and economic autonomy by having the opportunity to govern itself in an independent state. The second aspect is its justification of that act by claiming for itself the status of a nation. From that point the difference between a nation and an ethnic group should be clear. The basic difference between an ethnic group and a

nation, according to O'Sullivan, is that "unlike the ethnic group, the nation requires a sense of territoriality. The ethnic group can retain its identity without a geo-national *locus*...the nation cannot" (O'Sullivan, 1986: 5). Ethnic groups can either accept to assimilate or seek a system of political pluralism or at its more extreme form to secede from a state to form their own nation.

1.3 Sociological Approaches to Ethnic Nationalism

O'Sullivan (1986) lists several theories that are used in the literature on nationalism. Those are modernization theories, plural society and power conflict theories and Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories.

1.3.1 Modernization Approach

Modernization theories are based on the premises of the "Durkheimian emphasis upon social differentiation as society develops from the small traditional group -family, tribe, clan (*gemeinschaft*)- to the interest based community-class, party (*gesellschaft*)" (O'Sullivan, 1986: 6). Keating argues that with the modernization theory it was expected that

Industrialization, capitalism and urbanization would break down ascriptive roles and traditional values, substituting the impersonal relations of the market. Technology, mechanization and specialization would break down peripheral self-sufficient economies and encourage the spread of the centre's universalist values. Modern communications would erode regional languages. The modern state would extend the impartial, universal norms of bureaucratic administration. There might be revolts in the periphery in the transitional phase...These, however, would eventually be stilled by integration or by secession of the deviant territory, to produce sovereign governments which have no critical regional or community cleavages (1996: 43-44).

1.3.2 Plural Society and Power Conflict Approaches

The plural society model “emphasize the ordered segmentation resulting from colonization” (O’Sullivan, 1986: 8). Imperial expansion pursued by colonization has led to domination of some groups and incorporation of some others into the colonial state and its economy. According to Smith nations were formed in two main patterns. The first was “through a process of vernacular mobilization” that accounted for most of today’s national states .The second way was “a process of bureaucratic incorporation” (1995: 86). In most cases the path of incorporation had to start with the upper *strata* of the conquered lands.

In most cases, in fact, an aristocracy led usually by a king or prince and his court and staff, and supported by the clergy, ruled over one or more regional or ethnic communities and categories who supplied the labor and services necessary for the maintenance of the aristocracy’s life-style...In the course of the nineteenth century, the European colonial empires established a modified version of this basic pattern; in this case, the aristocracy in question was an overseas administrative elite, sometimes supported by missionaries and settlers, forming a ‘parallel society’(Smith ,1995: 86).

In the colonies the governing bodies were a mechanism for controlling indigenous population. This meant limiting their economic and political resources. “And nationalist movements are the effort of the subordinated group to secure control over its own political interests”(O’Sullivan, 1986: 9). In those settings nationalist movements that are powerless, faced with a colonizer who commands vast resources and armies, tends to emerge when there is a high degree of social segregation from the larger community. Plural society and power conflict theory focus on the competitive process in which the ethnic groups realize and try to protect their own interests. According to O’Sullivan (1986) the failure of the theory comes from seeing the

dominated group as one. This neglects the differing interests between members of one camp and gives a misleading picture of the reality.

1.3.3 Marxist and Neo-Marxist Approaches

The Marxist theory is based upon the role of the system of production that shapes the social environment as well as the differing political interests of the groups. According to Marxist theory as capital is accumulated in the hands of few, capitalists implement structures to protect their “competitive advantage”. Protective tariffs are one of those mechanisms to protect the *bourgeoisie* from foreign competition. A need for new markets to export occurs in a time when competition between capitalist states has intensified, profit rates have declined and displaced workers have started to mobilize against the bourgeoisie.

Capitalist states adopted programs of nationalist imperial expansion. They invade and colonize nonindustrial regions, extracting raw materials for home industry, using the markets as a market to export, employing colonial labor as cheap supply, and returning some benefits to the home labor market...this entire process is justified by ideologues which proclaim the superiority of the core state's nationality and hence its inherent right to dominate. And within the core state, the ruling class will also moderate class conflict by fostering ethnic antagonism among workers through mechanisms as differential wage rates and segregation. (O'Sullivan, 1986: 12).

Marxists see nationalism as a problem in capitalist societies since it serves to divide the proletariat. To the contrary, in colonies national attachment serves to defy capitalist domination of foreign powers. Marxists explanations are suitable for colonial contexts, but fail to explain the separatist movements in advanced capitalist societies.

Neo-Marxist theories, share some of the aspects of Marxist theories. O'Sullivan (1986) takes as the most influential theory, the internal colonial theory of Michael Hechter, the uneven development and split labor market theories. Those theories share with the Marxist approach the idea that the growth and concentration of capitalism in core states enflames the emerging *bourgeoisies* in peripheral colonized areas against metropolitan domination due to uneven development of the core against the peripheral areas. "Over time, the relative deprivation of the 'peripheral *bourgeoisie*' laid the ground for populist demands for independent state formations" (O'Sullivan, 1986:13).

Before explaining the neo-Marxist theories the terms "core" and "periphery" should be understood since those models are based on those definitions. According to Paddison (1983) the center is identified with certain social groups or with those groups that are closer to decision-making elites and the periphery is defined as distant from the center where all administrative, cultural and economic power are reunified.

In other words, the centre is a decision-making *nucleus* separated from the periphery, which is (or thinks of itself as) remote from the decision-makers. One of the defining features of the relationship is the idea of the domination of the periphery; another is the concept of dependence upon the centre (Paddison, 1986:77)

Hechter (1975) argues that a distinction should be made between societies, which have developed as a result of internal factors, and external involvement; since the second type of development generally occurs in Third World societies. In the second type of development an external group conquers a country and imposes its ethnic or cultural superiority on the materially inferior indigenous group.

A system of stratification where objective cultural distinctions are superimposed upon class lines. High status occupations tend to be reserved for those

of metropolitan; while those of indigenous culture cluster at the bottom of the stratification system. The economical pattern of development differs in the colonial situation...since the colony's role is designed to be instrumental, development tends to be complementary to that of metropolis. The colonial economy often specializes in the production of a narrow range of primary commodities or raw materials for export.(Hechter,1975:30)

The internal colonialism theory tries to show that reaction against cultural and economic domination of a core group leads to ethnic nationalism. "Centralisation of power, often perceived from the margins as internal colonialism, is the factor which provokes regional dissent and the desire for a distinctive voice" (Wagstaff, 1994: 13). Cultural domination occurs because of the economic advantageous position of some section -the core group- of the society, if this economic superiority leads to the cultural suppression of the disadvantaged group, this provokes the losers who link their failure to their difference of culture. In that case the occupational situation of minority groups will be the result of that economical domination; the minorities will occupy low-ranking status and jobs. "The peripheral economy is forced into complementary development to the core and thus becomes dependent to the core, and thus become dependent on external markets" (Hechter, 1975:33). Paddison argues that if industry is allowed to develop, it will exist primarily because of the core's needs. "In this sense dependence is likely to be characterized by greater economic specialization in the periphery, whereas the core will enjoy a diversified economic base" (Paddison, 1983:82). That dependence to foreign markets is reflected on the prices of the exported primary goods that start to fluctuate, and this brings the number of peripheral workers to the core with hopes to find better economic conditions to pursue their life. Increased contact between the core and periphery groups does not tend to narrow the economic differences between the groups, the distribution of

resources is still low since there is not a shift of power for the benefit of the subordinate group.

The obstacle to national development suggested by the internal colonial model analogy, therefore, relates not to a failure of peripheral integration with the core but to a malintegration established on terms increasingly regarded as unjust and illegitimate. (Hechter, 1975:34).

The uneven development theory emphasizes the “crucial role of the elites in the periphery and the importance of the structure of the state in shaping ethnic relations” (O’Sullivan, 1986:14). In fact, when an imperial state invades an area it tends to distribute some amount of benefits to the elites of peripheral areas. So, when traditional patrimonial relation between elites of the center and the periphery are damaged, elites may use this opportunity to mobilize effectively.

O’Sullivan (1986) explains split labor theory as an ethnic struggle between capital, indigenous as high priced labor, and ethnically distinct ‘cheap labor’. In that case it is argued that capitalists are not worrying about the ethnic worker base but an indigenous labor force that mobilized the market may feel threatened with the entrance of a new group of immigrant workers. They can reply to newcomers with “exclusionary movements, job segregation, or protectionist policies, which block access to cheap labor”. (O’Sullivan, 1986:15).

Split labor markets occur when two ethnic groups compete with one another for employment and when one group is paid a lower wage. The competition for jobs reinforces the ethnic boundary dividing the group and increases the likelihood of intergroup conflict.(Nagel,1995:5)

1.3.4 Resource Competition and Relative Deprivation Theories

O'Sullivan argues that all theories reflect some part of the truth. But she argues that ethnicity is not a simple subjective characteristic that can be easily manipulated for organizing competitive groups to obtain resources, but neither a primordial attachment that persists without the broader environment in which groups live. According to her, some conditions must met to give rise to strengthened ethnic boundaries. Those are competition for scarce resources, existence of leadership in one or of both groups that persuade its members that "resources are best secured through ethnic organization and solidarity", and the availability of a material basis for cultural identification provided by "ethnic organizations and institutions" (1986:164). Nagel gives several propositions about ethnic identification and inter-ethnic conflict.

1.Ethnicity is a problematic social category, the boundaries and meaning of which are negotiated by in-group and out-group members .2.To the extent that resource competition in a society is organized along ethnic lines, increased competition increases the likelihood of a. ethnic identification (strengthened ethnic boundaries); b. racism and prejudice (discrimination and hatred against ethnic competitors); c. interethnic conflict (interpersonal and intergroup violence); ethnic mobilization (movements and collective action).3.Increased interethnic contact (integration) in the presence of ethnic resource competition increases the likelihood of a. ethnic mobilization; b. racism and prejudice; c. interethnic conflict; and ethnic mobilization.(1995:1)

The relative deprivation theory focuses on the subjective belief that peripheral economies are disadvantaged because of control of the economy by the center. So they end up with larger autonomy claims. The claims are based on the assumption that they -the suppressed ethnic group- sacrifice much more to have less from the national budget. This leads to strong resentment towards the dominant ethnic group. Paddison claims that Ted Gurr has developed a general model that explains that situation well: "Relative deprivation leads to frustration, which in turn fuels discontent and results in

violence; in extreme cases this could lead to demands for territorial secession” (1983:86).

1.4. Justifying Separatism , Secession

Gurr lists four types of actions that communal groups use to manifest their grievances upon the state “that claims sovereignty over them” (1993:292). Those are exit, autonomy, access or control. Exit is the option to secede from a state, that option has the risk to “breakup the state and is threatening nationalism of dominant groups”. Autonomy and access are ways of accommodation between the subordinate and dominant group. Five types of arrangements can be chosen to devolve authority to the minority group: confederalism, federalism, regional autonomism, regional administrative decentralization and community.

Access means that minorities individually and collectively have the means to pursue their cultural, political, and material interests with the same rights and restraints apply to other groups. Control is the revolutionary aim of a minority or subordinate majority to establish the group’s political and economic hegemony over others (Gurr, 1993:292)

Secession by its nature required a kind of justification and for that theories of secession were developed.

A secession crisis occurs when the leaders representing a territorially concentrated and distinct community within a larger state translate discontent into demands for secession, and possess the power, either through sufficiently strong internal community mobilization or through the use of force, to compel the central government to react to those demands (Bartkus, 1999:10).

According to Bartkus four elements are necessary for a secession crisis to occur; “a distinct community”, “territory”, “leaders”, and “discontent”. First, an identifiable unit or a distinct community, which is smaller than the state, must present itself and

threaten to withdraw if not satisfied. Second, a kind of association should exist with a territory. Third, leadership plays an important role in organizing itself as a potential threat and to represent the voice for the community's demands. Fourth, discontent is an important element in bringing people together under a common cause. Bartkus has suggested a model that would make secession understandable and see the just conditions under which it can be achieved. For that, the model takes into account "(1) the benefits of continued membership in the larger existing political entity; (2) the costs of such membership; (3) the costs of secession; and (4) the benefits of secession" (1999: 4). Bartkus under the heading of the benefits of membership takes up those issues: security benefits, economic benefits, social benefits. According to Bartkus "both underdeveloped and economically advanced distinct communities are unwilling to secede due to the economic sacrifices such a decision would entail"(1999:43). The cost of the secession issue is dealt under two headings: state opposition and international hostility. States have opposed secessionist movements at all costs, although the cost of retaining some areas was higher than its benefits. The international community has reacted to those movements in accordance with the states' interests. The distinct communities used the principle of self-determination¹² to legitimize their attempts. With the UN General Assembly resolution 1514¹³,

¹² Article 1(2) of the UN Charter recognizes the right of self-determination as: To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

Article 55: With a view...the UN shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

¹³ The General Assembly Declares that: (1) the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries, adopted on December 14, 1960; the concept of self-determination became much more important. Rupesinghe argued that some problems related to the application of those decisions still existed.

1. The United Nations has not established any formal procedures for adjudicating claims to self-determination. The committee of 24, the Decolonisation Committee, entertains representations only on behalf of peoples whose territories they have listed, all of which are dependencies of former dependencies of European powers. But the Committee has no mechanism for examining claims from persons or organizations claiming to represent peoples aspiring to the right of self-determination, let alone of assessing to a set of agenda.2. A distinction is made in practice between the so-called “salt-sea” imperialism where the dominating and the dominated are separated by hundreds of miles, and “local” imperialism, where the two peoples are immediate neighbors. It has been assumed until very recently that peoples locked together within a state must remain so linked indefinitely. This means that many cases of “internal colonialism” do not come under the purview of any international body.3. The right to self-determination is treated essentially as a political right, rather than one of international law. (1996:21)

Another important term that was used in relation with self-determination was territorial integrity¹⁴. Hannum (1998) argues that the vagueness of the terms “self-determination” and “sovereignty” or “territorial integrity” have created confusion. In times of decolonization self-determination was equivalent to independence but later there were disagreements about their application to non-colonial situations.

Neither sovereignty nor self-determination is an absolute right. Each is limited by other rights and international obligations. Sovereignty is limited not only by

United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation; (2) all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status, freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. See Bartkus, Viva Ona. 1999. *The Dynamic of Secession*.

¹⁴ Article 2(4) of the UN charter reflects this attitude: The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles: ... (4) all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state. See Bartkus, Viva Ona. 1999. *The Dynamic of Secession*

the rights of other states and the innumerable political and economic ties that bind them, but also by a legitimate international interest in human rights, the environment, and other issues formerly considered the sole jurisdiction of the state (Hannum, 1998:1).

It is argued by Bartkus that internal turmoil, as a result of revolutionary campaigns, war, natural catastrophes or foreign assistance, can decrease central governments' power which in turn can decrease the costs of secession and open windows of opportunity for secessionist movements. Under the title of cost of membership are given the examples of deported or persecuted communities. Second, as an example of the membership cost, the loss of regional or ethnic cultures due to cultural homogenization policies of states is given. The integration of markets had restricted the *maneuvers* of the nation-state with the exception of few states like Japan, Germany and the United States; most states cannot do the planning for autonomous monetary policies. The development of regional trade arrangements like NAFTA or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) "has gone some way to providing citizens of small countries with the same economic advantages that have previously been enjoyed only by citizens of larger and more prosperous countries"(Bartkus, 1999:195). The benefits of membership therefore have not decreased but conditions that are more supportive of economic viability of new states have been created (Bartkus, 1999). The benefits of secession were summarized as elite interests and the principle of national self-determination was discussed. In the post-World War II era, the state opposition and the non-willingness of the international community to extend diplomatic recognition created a barrier for communities willing to form new states. However, if a community is able to form an independent state by seceding from a state, the elites are aware that they will benefit from "the political support and

economic aid which the international community provides to such newly emerging recognized states” (Bartkus, 1999:206)

1.5 Theories of Secessionism

Allen Buchanan tries to find answers to those basic questions:

1 Under what conditions does a group have a moral right to secede, independently of any questions of institutional morality, and in particular apart from any consideration of international legal institutions and their relationship to moral principles? 2 Under what conditions should a group be recognized as having a right to secede as a matter of international institutional morality, including a morally defensible system of international law? (1998:227)

According to Buchanan two basic types of theories for the right to secede exist:

Remedial Right Only theories, Primary Right theories.

The classic argument for the right to secede has similarities with the right to revolt, developed by John Locke. John Locke’s theory that gave people the right to overthrow their governments if they acted unjustly is important since that creates a conditional situation that legitimizes revolution.

There are conditions in which there is a right of revolution by the people against a tyrannical government, there may be an analogous right of secession, where a minority is subjected to tyranny in circumstances in which a revolution by the majority would be unlikely, ineffective or unjust. This argument makes oppression a necessary condition of the right (Freeman, 1998b: 16)

However there is a difference between the right to secede and the right to revolt. The right to secede is applicable only to a portion of the population living concentrated in a part of the territory of the state and “The object of the exercise of the right to secede is not to overthrow the government, but only to sever the government’s control over

that portion of the territory” (Buchanan, 1998:231). The Remedial Right Only theory focuses on the injustices carried out by a government not to a population at large, but rather to a particular group that lives in a particular area of the state. The right of secession for that group must be considered as the right of individuals subjected to a political authority that commits injustices, and by those individuals have the legitimate right to defend themselves against the oppressor (Buchanan, 1998). Events that can be considered as creating permissiveness to revolt are “unjust conquest, exploitation, threat of extermination, and threat of cultural extinction” (Beran, 1998:41).

Primary Right theories can be divided onto two parts: Ascriptive-Group theories and Associative-Group theories. According to Ascriptive-Group theories there is no necessity for political organization of a group nor any collective decision to form a political association for it to be considered a nation or people but ascriptive characteristics such as common culture, history, language, a sense of distinctiveness or an aspiration for establishing their own political unit are sufficient conditions of being considered as a nation (Buchanan, 1998). Associative-Group theories focus on the right of political association. According to the pure plebiscite theory, the right to secede “any group that can constitute a majority...in favor of secession within a proportion of the state has the right to secede”(Buchanan, 1998: 234). A variation of that theory is offered by Harry Beran who calls his theory the democratic theory of political self-determination, in which he criticizes the international law that gives states the right to counter internal and external threats to their territorial integrity with

force. “The democratic theory rejects the state’s right to meet with force internal challenges to its integrity but fully supports its right to so meet external challenges”

(Beran, 1998: 42). Beran claims that:

(a) Normal adults have the right of personal self-determination and, therefore, of freedom of association with willing partners (b) Territorial communities that have acquired their territory rightfully, have the right of habitation (c) A group has the right of political self-determination if it is a territorial community (or community of communities) and politically and economically viable as an independent entity. This right is derived from the rights mentioned in (a) and (b) (1998:39)

Buchanan (1998) argues that in Associative-Group theories, a group acquires the right to secede even under conditions in which the state is effectively performing its legitimating functions of just rule and security. When secession takes place (1) if that creates another minority within the new unit, “the formerly persecuted become the persecutors”(1998:240). (2) If not all members of the seceding group are included within the newly formed unit, that creates a problem of vulnerability of persecution for the group that stays within the old entity.

Chapter II

The British Occupation and Origins of the Emergence of the Problem of Northern Ireland

Ireland lies in the West of Great Britain and near the mainland of Europe has been mainly victimized by its geographical position. Ireland's settlers, as well as its early culture, came from European migrants. For Irish history the main theme was the relationship between England and Ireland that started from A.D 1100's onwards (Hernon, 1989). The English were able to conquer the island after long years of devastating wars that impoverished the country. Plantations, which amounted nearly to nine-tenths of the land, passed to English and Scottish landlords. Political and religious persecution and economic problems forced the Irish people to emigrate as the result of British conquest. Later the Irish were able to free themselves but some of their countrymen could not be liberated and are undergoing continuous repression in the Northern part of the isle. The root cause of the problem lies in the colonial past of Ireland, and the existence of a state which is seen as the actual continuation of that imperial idea to suppress Celtic lands and culture under the English cultural and territorial occupation. The endless struggle of the Irish people is worth to be analyzed

since it shows a conscience that was shaped throughout the ages to continue to try to restore the lands to whom it really belongs.

2.1 British Occupation of Ireland

Anglo-Normans invaded Ireland in 1169. In those days Ireland was divided into a multiplicity of autonomous tribes in which the economy was organized on semi-nomadic patterns of seasonal migration into pastures, so a kind of pastoral communalism prevailed.

When the Norman English arrived in late twelfth-century Ireland, they encountered a Gaelic nation united in language and tradition with a clan social structure, a system of Brehon laws, and a Catholicism that was more monastic than diocesan and remote from Rome in both distance and loyalty (Hachey, 1989: 1)

The tribes were acting as the basic political organization by dominating the political arena in a country where the land was common property. What is more, a decentralized church system and a belief system that had not abandoned paganistic practices existed. The Normans began the Anglicization of many aspects of Irish life such as political, social, cultural, and economic life and advanced the romanization of Irish Catholicism (Hachey, 1989: 1). At the opposite spectrum Anglo-Normans led a sedentary culture, and feudal power was concentrated in the hands of the centralized state, strong relations with the Roman-Catholic church was another contradiction that separated the island of Ireland and England. This meant that Europeans considered Irish social structure as primitive. As Pope Adrian declared it, he was happy to see Ireland that was considered as a land of savages finally conquered, and the dominion by the Roman church increased. In those days only a small portion of the isle was

under the strict control of the British Crown. In the district of Pale “the Irish were viewed as savages, whose religion was at best a pagan adaptation of Christianity and whose tribal organization appeared primitive to the strong feudal state”(O’Sullivan, 1986: 35). The Norman political apparatus with its parliament that was established in the Pale district of Ireland, from the 14th to the late 16th century, couldn’t reach the other parts of Ireland. Hachey (1989) argues that the tiny English occupation started to change its characteristics with the nationalization of the church in England. The preoccupations of the royal family started to change with the fear that the 89 percent of Irish Catholics would ally with the Roman Catholic Church (and other European powers). At first “the English, state controlled Church came into existence in 1537”(Hernon, 1989:15) in order to create an alternative organization. Serious colonization efforts started in 1541 with an act of parliament declaring Henry VIII King of Ireland. From 1565 the Crown started to encourage individuals to settle in Ireland in order to replace the Irish peasants with English planters. (Hachey, 1989).

The struggle there in the sixteenth century became more embittered than ever because Ireland had remained Roman Catholic when England had become protestant in the middle of the century. The conquest of Ireland was the largest military undertaking of Elizabeth’s reign, costing over £ 1m, or the total revenue for three years which was far more than any other military or naval activities, and a new wave of English Landlords was able to gain estates if they could hold the rebellious Irish population in subjection (T.O.Lloyd, 1996:15)

The newcomers were also bringing the newly adopted religion and that led to serious conflict between the *Old Catholic English* people and the *New Protestant English People*. Religion became a way to acquire the status of elites. (Hernon, 1989) Descendants of the original English colonizers that had come well before England had adopted Protestantism rejected the Protestant religion by considering it as a cultural

dimension of 16th century Tudor conquests. Twice in the next century they joined with Gaels to reverse the property and power results of Elizabethan and Cromwellian victories. They countered the plantations that were the result of Tudor, Stuart, and Cromwellian policies (Hachey, 1989: 1). The old elites joined the masses in order to counter the new settlers. However the aims of the allies were different, Gaels wanted to restore their previous cultural order but the Old English intended to take back the control of the Irish political nation. The conquests of William III ended with the assimilation, common defeat and suffering of the Old English and Gael into one oppressed Irish Catholic nation. While most of the Gaelic and Old English aristocracy and gentry turned Protestant to protect their property, influence, and status the masses remained Catholic (Hachey, 1989: 2). After order was reestablished in Ireland by the new elites in 1590, Ulster was the only one of the four provinces that was still free of English dominion. The strong resistance to England that started in the Ulster region in 1590, was supported by the French dynasties was suppressed in 1607. This meant that the entire Irish isle was invaded and the conquest of Ireland was accomplished in 1607. The motivation behind this conquest was mostly economic. Economists claimed that the country was over-populated and believed that the problems of poverty and unemployment would be reduced if “the surplus hands and mouths would go overseas”, but they did not suggest to the government to pay for them to go. (T.O.Lloyd, 1996)

2.2 Immigration to Ireland and Implications for the Native Population

As a result of the British victory, the last tribes were defeated and eliminated from the political sphere. Some 150,000 Scots and 20,000 English migrated to the northeastern provinces of Ireland after a series of enactments (1607) that confiscated land from the Irish peasantry. O'Sullivan (1986) speculates that those enactments pushed the Irish peasantry into small reservations. The northeast corner of the island was populated with Protestants since Protestant landlords owned most of the land compared with the rest of the island. In 1641 a Catholic uprising against the Protestants of Ulster and English authority over the island began. However much of the island didn't rebel against the monarchy: the Republic was determined to undermine the Catholic Irish and the Royalist Irish, seeing not much differences between the two. Cromwell took his army across St. George's channel and invaded Ireland, and declared the island a republic. By 1650 it was clear that the English government was going to reconquer the island (T.O.Lloyd, 1996). The Republic had then to face other problems. Many Royalists had gone into exile in the colonies, especially Virginia and the new government could not expect that its orders would be obeyed on the other side of the Atlantic. Cromwell's foreign policy was based on anti-Catholic and anti-Spanish sentiment that aimed to maintain a balance of power by opposing the strongest nation in Europe. Cromwell's death in 1658 led to a change in the regime accompanying the collapse of the Republican system, and Charles II returned to his father's throne. Cromwell had understood that a monarch with some claim to divine authority could rule three separate kingdoms separately while in the possession of three separate crowns, and that a republic, in order to not disintegrate, had to have a parliament

which united all the British isles. Once he had dethroned the King, he created a House of Commons to which Scotland and Ireland elected members. Charles II, when he took back the throne, returned to the old system of three separate kingdoms, united by virtue of the same man that was head of each of them. (T.O.Lloyd, 1996). James the brother of Charles became the new king in 1685, but his rule lasted three years because he was considered as a tyrant since his reign was too strict, and he seemed to favor the Catholic cause. In 1688, William of Orange overthrew him. William's accession to the English throne changed the foreign policy of Britain with a return of hostility towards France, "and for almost all of the following 125 years England was either at war with France or preparing for war with France or recovering from war with France" (T.O.Lloyd, 1996). William in order to bring back the territories of the King of England into obedience used the methods employed by Cromwell. The resistance in Scotland was easily broken but that of Ireland lasted relatively long. As the Catholic majority saw James as their best hope for power, William had to fight a long war in Ireland where resistance survived until the victory at the Boyne in 1690. The successful defense in Londonderry, and the victory of 1690 became an unforgettable part of the Protestant tradition. Whereas the treaty of Limerick and the Protestant failure to apply the religious tolerance which was part of the treaty became immovable parts of the Catholic interpretation of the history of Ireland (T.O.Lloyd, 1996). The basic difference that existed between the Scottish people and the Irish people, although both were of Celtic origin was that the Scottish people were Protestant and English-speaking, whereas the Irish people were Catholic and Gaelic-speaking. (O'Sullivan, 1986). The policies of the Crown functioned well, and in 1659

English and Scots settlers constituted 37 percent of the Ulster region. In the areas where the soil was most fertile the new settlers started to become majorities, at least to become bigger minorities. In the South (the districts of Pale and Dublin) the natives were also restricted to the land. "In 1703 altogether Catholics owned 15% of Irish soil. By 1778 this share had declined to 5%" (Hernon, 1989:29).

Hachey (1989) comments that between the years of 1586-1692 the Irish parliament sat in Dublin for a total of only fifteen years. The American War of Independence had affected the structure of the British administration profoundly. The administration of the colonies, the Secretary of State for American Affairs and the Board of Trade that was its advisory council were abolished. Colonial affairs were transferred to the Home Secretary (Adams, 1991). Finally in 1719, the English parliament passed a Declaratory Act guaranteeing English control over all Irish legislation (O'Sullivan, 1986). The new government passed laws which subjected Ireland to legislation by Westminster, and which impeached the Irish Parliament from adopting laws that would not have been approved by London. The freedom claimed by American Assemblies in the years just before the Declaration of Independence was taken from Ireland (Hernon, 1989). The British Lord-Lieutenant in Dublin still was holding legal powers of the monarch and exercising active control of the executive, with the instructions taken from the government of London. He had a similar position that of an American colonial governor against the Irish Parliament, but London expected him to manage his Parliament more effectively than the governors did. (T.O. Lloyd, 1996). This meant that all the protectionary walls of Ireland were by-passed, all customs

were lifted on English goods. The Irish small urban mercantile class was deeply harmed by differential taxation and English protectionist measures, and by the end of the 18th century emigration to America started, where they formed one sixth of the population at that time.

2.3 The Rise of Reactionary Movements Among the Irish

Hachey (1989) claims that with the beginning of 1740's secret paramilitary groups emerged in order to resist the Catholic competition against the landowners in Ulster. They started to renounce traditional religious patronage by replacing Protestant tenants with Catholics, who paid higher rents and to cultivate on smaller plots. In 1782 an attempt to form an independent country under a joint British Crown was launched by a clandestine organization called the Irish Volunteers.

Competition for land tenancies between Catholic and Protestants provoked the existing antagonism. After some sectarian clashes in Armagh and Tyrone, the Orange Order was formed in 1795 (Hepburn, 1980). The Orange Order, emerging as a militant Protestant organization aimed to preserve Protestant advantages over that of Catholics, immediately began attacking and driving Catholics out of North Armagh and South Tyrone. The Orangemen who did not attack government institutions, emerged as defenders of Protestant supremacy, and its members were recruited quickly to the yeomanry which was a part-time force offered by the landlords (Farrell, 1980).

Hachey (1989) stresses that the violence used by the Protestants to distinguish themselves from the Catholics, to manifest their real interests led to an Irish rebellion in 1798, aiming to form a kind of Irish republic influenced by the French Revolution. The majority of the population wanted to create a country where the state apparatus recognized the interests of the Catholics without sacrificing Protestant interests, i.e. a kind of republic, which would encompass the religious identities. The rebellion that started in 1798 was short and bloody. The Irishmen lost. "The Irish parliament held its last session in August 2, 1800"(McCaffrey, 1989:53) As a result of the victory the Westminster declared the "*Act of Union (1801)*". This abolished the Irish parliament and incorporated Ireland into the British parliamentary system. The Act of Union had brought important structural changes that was accompanied by important population movement:

The restrictions on industry and trade were lifted and Ulster, especially Belfast, prospered under the Union...The population of Belfast jumped from 20,000 in 1801 to 100,000 in 1851 and 350,000 in 1901. Belfast was becoming a major industrial city like Birmingham and Glasgow...The Belfast businessmen and merchants quickly began to forget their former nationalism and republicanism and became strong supporters of the Union -after all they have a vested interest in it (Farrell, 1980: 14).

Those structural changes led to enrichment in the North, while the Southern parts of the country stagnated. The North with the lifting of restrictions developed a linen industry. The linen industry paved the way for the development of an engineering industry making textile machinery. Those businessman, who monopolized the linen machinery in the United Kingdom that led to the development of an export trade, later established the biggest dry dock in the world, so a shipbuilding industry started to flourish in Belfast in 1858 (Lloyd.1996).

2.4 Importance and Impact of the Orange Order Upon Irish Nationalism

The Orange Order that was extremely Protestant dedicated itself to maintaining Protestant privileges and supremacy. It held considerable influence over small farmers and Protestant workers demoralized and brutalized by living conditions in the industrial slums. The influence of the Orange Order increased with the growth of sectarian tension in Belfast, and with the migration of the Catholics to areas of industrial expansion. When in early 1800's only 6 percent of the town's population was Catholic there was little religious tension. As Belfast became a gigantic industrial machine, especially after the famine, Catholics began to move in, and in 1861 Catholics reached one third of the population. As low wages and periodic economic depressions hit the Protestant workers they began seeing Catholics as a threat. Finally serious sectarian riots broke in 1857, 1864, and 1872. (Farrell, 1980)

2.5 Home Rule and Irish Nationalism

In 1885 the Home-Rule Party led by Parnell, a protestant land-owner but who represented the growing Catholic middle class in the South had obtained 85 seats in Westminster, and 17 of the 33 seats in Ulster. He tried to obtain a kind of limited form of government for Ireland (*Home Rule Bill*). However, the business classes of Ulster did not welcome his moves. So, the alliance between the majority of Ulster businessman with the conservative party and landlord-dominated local Tories defeated that proposal in 1886.

Although Home Rule was a type of devolution, which would give Ireland, rather less power within the United Kingdom than the provinces had within the Canadian federation, most Englishmen saw it as a terrible threat to their country.

When the crisis ended in mid-1886 the Liberals were out of office for most of the next twenty years (T.O.Lloyd, 1996:213).

The Orange Order, by exploiting the tensions between Protestants and Catholics, and recalling the past struggles between settlers and natives claimed that Home Rule would mean domination by the Catholic Church. This way it was able to mobilize the Protestant masses and rioting from June to September of 1886 resumed. In 1893 another bill passed Commons but was stopped by the Lords (Farrell, 1980).

Most colonial politicians supported home rule for Ireland; some of them merely wanted to conciliate any fervent Irishmen they might have among their voters by advocating a fairly modest change but some of them, of whom Cecil Rhodes was the outstanding example, believed that a discontented Ireland was bad for imperial unity and a pacified Ireland with a certain amount of devolution would serve as an example that would make it easier to build a united empire that could agree in a common policy (T.O.Lloyd, 1996: 230)

As the inevitability of the Home Rule bill became apparent, Protestants started to organize themselves, and established a separate Ulster Unionist Council (UUC), and in 1910 they selected Edward Carson¹⁵ as their leader. In 1911 Carson threatened to establish a Provisional government in Ulster if the Home rule Bill passed. Unionists started forming a private army recruited by the help of the Orange Order to acquire means of acting independently from the other actors. Sir James Craig¹⁶ leader of the Irish Unionist Council “announced that if necessary, Ulster Protestants were ready to

¹⁵ Edward Carson, Lord Carson of Duncairn 1854-1935: Unionist leader, Dublin Protestant. Successful barrister in both Irish and British courts. Elected Unionist MP for Dublin University at Westminster in 1892, he became Solicitor General for Ireland 1900-05. Elected leader of the Unionist Council in 1911, he presided over the signing of the Covenant and the formation of the UVF. Guided Unionists through Home Rule crisis of 1911-14 and War of Independence 1919-21, with interlude as British Attorney General 1915-16, First Lord of the Admiralty and a member of Lloyd George's War Cabinet 1917-18. Refused premiership of the new Northern Ireland state and retired from Irish politics in 1921, when he was created Lord Carson of Duncairn. Member of Orange Order. (Farrell, 1980:338)

¹⁶ Sir James Craig, Lord Craigavon 1871-1940: First Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. Company director and landowner. Unionist MP for East Down at Westminster 1906-21. Treasurer of the Household 1916-18; MP at Stormont 1921-40. Prime Minister of Northern Ireland 1921- 40. Member of the Orange Order. Made Lord Craivagon 1926. (Farrell, 1980:339)

swear allegiance to the German Kaiser in preference to the control of an Irish Catholic Parliament”(McCaffrey, 1989:149). In 1913 a veteran of many colonial wars, a retired member of the British army Sir George Richardson took the lead of the private army called the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The end of 1913 saw a force of Irish National Volunteers to counter UVF.

Colonial nationalism first emerged because people in the colonies could see ways in which they differed from Englishmen and wanted administrative arrangements to express the fact, but it did not mean they wanted to disturb the framework of imperial unity.(T.O.Lloyd, 1996: 105).

The National Volunteers were under the control of an uneasy alliance between Sinn Fein supporters, members of Irish Republican Brotherhood¹⁷(IRB) and United Irish League¹⁸ (UIL). In 1916 the IRB and Sinn Fein volunteers refused to participate in the war as an ally of Great Britain, and on Easter Monday 1916, they proclaimed the Irish Republic by seizing the Dublin Post Office and the center of Dublin. The rebellion was easily crushed. But this led to the beginning of the war of independence against British rule in Ireland between 1918-1924. The eruption of war simplified the implementation of legislation giving Ireland Home Rule (Jackson, 1999). The Easter rising was easily suppressed since at the time the idea of independence was not

¹⁷ Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB): A revolutionary secret society dedicated to the establishment of an Irish Republic by force. It was first known as the Fenians and organized an unsuccessful rising in 1867 and a bombing campaign in England. It was re-organized as the IRB in 1873 and eventually infiltrated the Sinn Fein party and the Irish Volunteers. It was the IRB, which planned the 1916 Rising and re-organized the Volunteers into the IRA in 1918-19. Michael Collins was a leading figure in the IRB and under his influence it supported the Treaty and swung much of the IRA behind it. The IRB ceased to have much influence after Collins’ death in 1922 (Farrell, 1980:355).

¹⁸ United Irish League (UIL): Set up in 1898 as a mass organization to agitate for land reform, the UIL helped to re-unite the divided Irish Home Rule Party and then provided its constituency organization and branches. The UIL was effectively the voice of the Irish Catholic middle class and the Church before the First World War. Mildly reformist on social issues, it was solidly constitutionalist and anti-revolutionary. After 1916 it was swept aside by Sinn Fein everywhere except in the North, where Joe Devlin and the AOH held it together a little longer. Some of the Belfast branches were still in existence up to 1925 (Farrell, 1980: 364).

popular. When the leaders of the uprising were shot after trial by a court-martial, a feeling of sympathy emerged for them and their cause became a popular one. (T.O.Lloyd, 1996).

2.6 The Birth of IRA / Irish Republican Army

In 1919 Irish Volunteers re-armed and re-formed themselves to form the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In return a special kind of paramilitary organization was formed in Northern Ireland with the help of Britain in 1920-The Specials. It was formed to help the RIC, the British Police in the region.

The last of the bills came in 1920 and proposed two home rule parliaments in Ireland. One was to be set up for most of the country, and the other for six of the nine counties of Ulster--both parts would be represented in Westminster. That last proposition would be the accepted but at a cost of thousands of Catholics who were displaced from their homes in Ulster, of hundreds of civilians dead within two years (McCaffrey, 1995). Finally the free parliament opened and the Ulster parliament representing six counties out of nine was recognized as a kind of state in the northern part of Ireland. After sectarian-based violent clashes and three years of fruitless diplomacy by the South, both parts agreed to recognize each other and finally on December 6 1922, the Irish Free State was established formally. The establishment of the Irish Free State did not mean that the conflict was over, since in three counties of Ulster Catholics were still the majority. That created a special environment where the fear of Catholics materialized itself with the formation of the Ulster state, in which all

political power and patronage were in the hands of the Protestants. Protestants on the contrary tried not to lose what they had obtained; their fear was to be left alone by Britain against Catholic Ireland since they were in a tiny majority, which permitted them to control the system. Memories of massacres were mostly used to create a political consciousness. Protestants in Ulster used the Orange Order to create solidarity.

The Ulster Unionists kept up their organisation, cemented the Orange link and secured the allegiance of the Protestant workers by a systematic policy of discrimination against Catholics which left the Protestants with a virtual monopoly of the well paid-skilled trades, especially in the shipbuilding and engineering industry.(Farrell, 1980 :16)

As in Ulster the Protestants subdued the Catholics, both sections of society lived in a continual struggle in which both tried to establish their political dominance over the other in armed conflicts and with mobs. The Protestants used their institutional domination whereas Catholics used the geographical advantage of being surrounded by the Irish Free State. That led to the development of fear of extinction, respectively.

Memories of massacre have made survival the most salient goal for both communities, many of whose members believe they must protect their group identity at all costs.. The fundamentalist Protestant leader Ian Paisley has compared the events of 1641 both to the St. Bartholomew `s Day massacre of 1572 in France (.) To the contemporary actions of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Crighton & Mac Iver, 1991: 129)

Paisley in his argument against unifying with Ireland speaks of “genocide” as the decrease in the number of Protestants living in the Irish Free State from 10 percent to 3 percent in the last sixty years. Although it had happened mostly through intermarriage and assimilation, for many Protestants the fear of cultural extinction is still an important *phobia*.

Just as the Maronites see themselves as the last outpost of Western and Christian civilization in the region, encircled and menaced by hostile Islamic forces so many Protestants view Ulster as the last bastion of Evangelical Protestantism in Western Europe (Crighton & Mac Iver, 1991: 129)

In the Irish case the interests of Protestants were protected as follows: At first the domination by English forces under Cromwell and later William of Orange created a dominant position against the Catholics. Later rigid laws that stopped their participation in politics were applied. In late 18th and early 19th centuries some reforms were implemented but in those times the Irish parliament has been closed several times and direct rule was applied by Westminster. When demands came from Catholics for “Home Rule” it was perceived as something that would damage Protestant interests since the political culture of the country was not permitting equal participation, but rather domination by one group over the other, in the areas where one has its majority. Tactics that aimed to terrorize the whole population, or the population of an enclave accompanied domination. A kind of war is pursued in order to force people to migrate or to be pacified in the living environment.

It was a time of irregular armies: the Irish Republican Army could have no legal existence, private armies were fighting across all the eastern European frontiers created by the Versailles Treaty, and the British government created its own irregular armies -the black and tans, and the auxiliaries- to fight the I.R.A. As a military device it was successful enough, but it weakened Englishmen’s confidence in the justice of their cause to see the rough instruments that had to be used to make it effective (T.O.Lloyd, 1996:285)

Societies that have lost the ability to cooperate were waging wars in what they perceived as something that would make the society ill. Those events are results of the erosion of the institutional legitimacy in places that have lost the capability to reach a section of the society, since the institutions were generally not autonomous but dependent on a group. (Tonge, 1998) As long as the state apparatus or institutions

would not serve the interest of the suffering group, as long as deprivation continued and no other avenue exists to cure the grievances, the apparition of new radical groups will not be a surprise since alienation is the result. As those groups are alienated they lost the capability to compromise and to reach political solutions. Those groups rather each year commemorate some historical events such as battles by organizing some marches that can easily be used to inflame the masses to attack the “other” group. The Protestant marches are typical examples of that. Each year those marches are done. “Because of the need to keep a similar vigil over the liberties they perceive themselves as having won. Moderates who seek to forget the conflicts of the past are charged with betraying the heritage of Protestantism in Ireland” (Crighton & Mac Iver: 137)

One can see from the Irish case that the conflict was caused by several reasons coming from the earlier English presence to the ensuing confrontations .The reasons are economic. The presence of settlers and the monopolization of resources, by confiscating the most fertile lands from the Catholics, and giving them to few and approved persons. It is also cultural since, an intolerant culture flourished in the course of the struggle for scarce resources. This required being a member of the dominant religion in order to acquire or to prolong the status of being an elite. It is also social since the migration of societies is one of the main reasons of the problem. It fueled the competition for valuable land and gave superiority to the owners of those goods.

The invaders who came from the mainland colonized an area first by taking the most important places, these forcing migrations of the population from their areas in the agricultural era. Second, they have incorporated the conquered lands into the center, at least for administrative use. They inflamed sectarian issues and used violence to subdue Catholics, and gave some privileges to poor Protestant classes by taking them to the machinery, which would ensure their domination over the Catholics: the yeomanry. When the landlords and merchants of Ireland faced the protective walls of England they tried to break away from the center and easily forgot sectarian divergence. But the center (England) with the Act of Union in 1801 provided some possibilities for the development of an indigenous industry, so as an uneven development theorist would suggest the elites were bribed for the continuation of British rule. This industry as it developed in a colonial setting required specialization in some issues as Hechter also would put forth. A linen industry and later a shipping industry flourished to become the best of all British production areas. The increase in production led to immigration of the Catholics to the Belfast area since the other areas populated by them became poorer after the Act of Union. Catholics who moved to industrial areas faced violence from Protestant lower classes as they were seen as a threat as was dictated by the split labor theory. So as O'Sullivan would approve, the competition for resources increased the level of tension. The first sectarian rioting appeared in those years when perceptual explanations were given to create the enemy. As Catholics faced violence realized that they could not be successful under Protestant rule, they started to forge new ways to free themselves, as Brown would put it with domestic explanation to the effect that the requirement of security was not fulfilled

within the existing state. So they tried constitutional ways such as *Home Rule*. But all this agitated the proprietors of the lands who resorted to every effort possible to preserve their interests. At first riots reappeared in industrial settings, later Protestant elites propagated to the masses for some kind of autonomy to create their own state. As Brown would put it again, in the domestic explanations and systemic explanations, the size of the group and the security dilemma affected the situation. The fear that the large group, if it acquired the means, led the Protestants with British assistance to adopt the idea of a state for themselves. World War I created a window of opportunity, as Bartkus would say, for the Catholics, to commence a bloody civil war to create the opportunity to liberate themselves. Protestant elites also used another window of opportunity, a Civil war, to create their own state. Protestants were able to form their own state in which systematic discrimination was applied against Catholics in order to strengthen the dominant *ethos* to secure a viable microstate whose only *raison d'être* would be oppression of Catholics.

Chapter III

The Problem of Northern Ireland in the Aftermath of World War I

3.1 The socio-political developments in Northern Ireland in the Aftermath of World War I :

After World War I Britain had to solve the problems that had emerged during the war with its dominions. During the war Britain had accepted that in cases of need of armed forces Britain would consult with its dominions. If not, the dominions would have the right not to send armed forces to areas of conflict. But during the war only New Zealand accepted British request of assistance willingly. Australia did it reluctantly, while Canada and South Africa found ways to escape from their commitments (Lloyd, 1996).

The failure to receive the armed forces contingent from her dominions forced Britain to change its policies. London wanted to return to its pre-war strategy of not consulting its dominions while pursuing its own policies and asking for help in serious situations. The dominions were not satisfied with the British point of view and wanted to make treaties that reflected the changes in their status after 1914 in the international community (Adams, 1991). Ireland obtained the status of dominion only in 1921.

Ireland was different in the way it acquired that status since it became a dominion, not as a result of evolution or constitutional process, but of revolutionary action.

Broadly speaking there were two possible Commonwealth policies for Irish governments after 1921. The first was to refashion the Commonwealth in closer accord with Irish interests and outlook; the second to seek the first opportunity to unravel,...to sever, Irish ties with the Commonwealth. These alternatives, again speaking very broadly, were pursued in turn by president Cosgrave's government from 1922 to 1932, and by President de Valera's administration from 1932 onwards (Mansergh, 1997:109-110).

In 1926 the definition of relations between Commonwealth countries was clarified in the Balfour Declaration, which recognized member countries as equal. In 1931 the Statute of Westminster gave the right to dominions to control their own constitutions. Those steps, or in other words concessions, were understood as the beginning of the disintegration of the British Empire (Adams, 1991). The start of devolution policies in some dominions after the Great War, yielded to transformations in the balance of political parties of the dominions. Those who were able to capture power were able to fix the pattern of politics for the next sixty years. Exceptions were Ireland --in, which the Fianna Gael made the settlement of 1921 with Britain lost the government to Fianna Fail in 1932-- and Great Britain; in other countries the parties in power were able to stay in power for three decades in the dominions (Lloyd, 1996).

After the Balfour Declaration in 1927 another important change occurred. Britain started to appoint High Commissioners to all the dominions to show its views on diplomatic issues, by putting aside the Governors-General that were representing the King as the head of each state and who had the right to dissolve parliaments. Following this, the dominions wanted the appointment of natives to that ceremonial

post. The Statute of Westminster was proclaimed as a further step of dissolution (Darwin, 1988). The change gained from the statute was pressed by Ireland and South Africa. Those countries were embarrassed with the idea of going to London for formal ratification for every little change in their constitution. Countries like Australia, New Zealand and Newfoundland were not impressed with the idea to change constitutions locally.

People rather liked the idea that a constitutional change was a serious matter that went through the formal process of approval by the Mother of parliaments at Westminster... so these countries left the power of amendment in London, with the knowledge that they could ask for it to be transferred to them at any time. (Lloyd, 1996: 300)

Canada also preserved its links with Great Britain not only for reasons of sentiment but also to reassure the province of Quebec against Ottawa's anti-Quebec or centralizing policies. With the financial collapse of the 1930s, the dominions entered a crisis. They had to repay their debts, but as the world markets collapsed, the prices of their exports that consisted mainly of food and raw materials were much more affected than what they were importing (Adams, 1991).

Later the British government adopted a differing economic policy, by giving up the gold standard by ceasing to keep the value of the pound equal to a fixed weight of gold in order to form an economic unit in which currencies remain fixed in value against each other though they floated against non-sterling currencies. In that way Britain settled most of the economical and constitutional questions that Commonwealth countries faced (Crokaert, 1940).

The interests of Great Britain differed in many issues from the dominions. Great Britain made its own foreign policy, while member states tried to avoid making policy decisions and relied on Britain. But they faced contradictory situations:

To some extent the two sides in the discussion were at cross-purposes; the immediate hope of the British was that a number of unemployed would go overseas, while the Dominions were concerned to avoid becoming a dumping ground for failures (Lloyd, 1996: 304)

British emigration slowed down by the 1920's and the whole pattern of the previous three centuries was reversed in the 1930's. As a result of that, British population increased by 500,000 in the 1930's. Britain had acquired those colonies without any payment and had used the resources of these countries at very low costs, but this habit would have to change. Britain saw that the cost of retaining the colonies surpassed the benefits; the first problem to be tackled was the large number of people coming from abroad. All these were indoctrinated to feel British, but now the turn had come for the British people to believe also to what they had teach to peoples from their colonies (Crokaert, 1940).

3.2 The Anglo-Irish Treaty and the Civil War

The period between 1918 to 1923 were to be bloody years. At first the old Home Rule party (UIL) was ousted by Sinn Fein. Later an illegal Irish parliament was established in Dublin. The Parliament was formed in opposition to Westminster as a symbol of the War of Independence against Britain. On January 21, 1919 both the Unionists and UIL members boycotted the parliament when it convened and declared its independence. Later IRA units attacked the Royal Irish Constabulary barracks and the

war began. In October 1919 a bill introduced in Westminster suggested to establish two local parliaments with limited powers to represent Westminster. At the same time the struggle continued between the IRA and the paramilitary armies of the Unionists, accompanied with massive expulsions of people in order to establish and reinforce Ulster and its boundaries. Although the nationalists wanted the whole island, the fear of the Protestants was to be absorbed by the Catholics and led to acceptance of the 1920 Act, which gave Ulster a parliament with limited jurisdiction. Fraser (2000) also argues that the partition of Ireland originated with the 1920 Act. The Southerners were ready to accept the Northern state but believed that if a boundary commission would be formed places like Tyrone, Fermanagh, Derry City where the nationalists were majorities would be given to them. But that did not materialize. The 1920 Act was accepted on the condition that the boundary commission would start working. The Irish leaders Griffith and Collins learned from Lloyd George that the commission would give those lands to the North. That was reflected on the treaty signed between the Irish and British states. The Anglo-Irish treaty created the Irish Free State by giving greater autonomy to the South with a dominion status. This would mean Southern Ireland would continue to be a part of the Commonwealth. Ireland would benefit from the same status as Canada (Adams, 1991). Both would pledge their allegiance to the King, who in return would send a Governor-General responsible for political arrangements and would supervise the constitution. Giving greater autonomy to the Southern part the status quo was legitimized, since the division between the two entities was confirmed. When the dominion status was acquired for the Southern part, some parts of society were not happy with the situation (Shannon, 1985).

The Irish parliament of the south, the “Dail” accepted the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Ireland’s first President de Valera resigned from his office. De Valera resigned because he believed that the Dominion status made Ireland vulnerable to Britain. He would have preferred an external association with the empire (Fraser, 2000). That event increased the level of polarization between those who were for dominion status and those aiming for independence (led by Michael Collins). Pro-and anti-Treaty forces started a civil war. A pro-treaty government was successful in controlling the Dail. Those who were successful in controlling the parliament were the Free State Army; their opponents were called IRA. In the election of June 1922 only 36 anti-treaty Sinn Fein were elected to the 128-seat Dail. The IRA increased its operations with the Easter Rising tactics against the treaty forces, but could not win the battle against the treaty forces equipped with superior weapons and backed by the Roman Catholic Church. Not until 1927, constitutional politics dominated the political sphere. Former president de Valera formed a new party called as Fianna Fail (“Soldiers of Destiny”) to oppose Fine Gael¹⁹ (Shannon, 1985:9).

Fianna Fail’s policy combined cultural, economic and political nationalism, and in particular was aiming at the dismantling of the 1921 settlement. In cultural terms, de Valera’s vision of a Gaelic Ireland was pursued through the continued fostering of the Irish language. In economic policy the goal was greater self-sufficiency and industrial development through a tariff policy (Fraser, 2000:18).

The question of land annuities created problems between Fianna Fail and Great Britain (Lloyd, 1996). Land annuities were payments made in the period 1891-1909

¹⁹ **Fine Gael (FG):** Southern political party formed by a merger between Cumann na nGaedheal (the free state government in 1920s), the National Centre Party, led by a son of the last leader of the UIL, and General O’ Duffy’s blueshirts. Founded in 1933 with O’ Duffy as its first leader, it looked as if Fine Gael would become a semi-Fascist party on the European model. O’ Duffy was forced to resign however and it settled down to become an orthodox conservative party, pro-British and anti-Republican (Farrell, 1980, p. 353) .

by the farmers, which have enabled them to buy back their farms from their landlords. Under arrangements between London and the Cosgrave governments in 1923 and 1926, the annuities were remitted to London. Those represented 18% of government spending and were seen as the major impediment to economic progress. As the 1923 and the 1926 agreements were not ratified in the Dail, de Valera wanted to find ways not to pay that large amount of money to Great Britain. For this he chose two policy: The first one was to remove the oath of allegiance to King George V, the second way to withhold the payment of the land annuities. The British government's decision against those policies was to impose a 20% duty on imports from Ireland basically for agricultural goods. The Irish for their part choose to tax British exports of coal, cement, sugar, electrical machinery, iron and steel to counter the economic offensive of Britain. The issue of annuities was not to be solved for a longer period.

Another problem coming from the 1921 Treaty with England according to de Valera was the existence of the office of Governor-General. In 1932, its holder James MacNeill has been removed from office and was replaced by a member of the Fianna Fail, Donal O'Buachalla. He worked to decrease the meaning of the office of Governor-General. De Valera had thought of a gradual plan towards the nullification of the dominion status, and the establishment of a republic (Lloyd, 1996).

In 1936, in a time of crisis in Britain within the royal family, De Valera ordered the introduction of two acts. The Constitutional Amendment Act removed the monarch from the constitution, whereas the other called the External Relations Act retained the

symbolic role of the monarchy in foreign affairs (Fraser, 2000). With those steps, De Valera moved from the Free State to nearly a republic. The new constitution was accepted by 685,105 voters to 526,945. It came into effect on December 29, 1937. The constitution formed under the guidance of de Valera had some kind of republican aspirations and Catholic social teachings mixed with a kind of pragmatism. The name of the Free State was changed to "*Eire*".

Before World War II, in the spring of 1938, De Valera sat for negotiations with the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain. They reached an agreement on April 25 on the issue of the annuities with an Irish payment of 10 million pounds. Also, Britain had to evacuate three southern ports of Ireland. Prime Minister Chamberlain was bitterly criticized by Winston Churchill for the loss of the ports since those had strategic importance in times of war.

By making the 1921 treaty obsolete, De Valera had systematically, started to distance Ireland from the British Imperial system (Lloyd, 1996). But the distance between the two jurisdictions of Ireland was also augmenting at a time when the tension between religious sects was not diminishing.

3.3 Ulster, a repressive state apparatus

In reality the struggle for the Catholics didn't end since they believed that three more counties should at least join the South because they were in majority in these counties. The Protestants although embarrassed to have such a large minority within the new

state thought that if they gave up those counties, they would lose all their advantages and would abandon 90,000 Protestant to the South. So, the division of the island was based upon politics rather than geography (Farrell, 1980). Incorporation of all nine counties of Ulster into Northern Ireland would create a situation where a dangerous proportion would occur 56% Protestants to 44% of Catholics. "There were then 890,000 Protestants and 690,000 Catholics in Ulster. Since the Catholics had a higher birthrate, it was conceivable that by the end of the century, they would comprise a slight majority"(Shannon, 1985: 12). When the state was established with six counties, by excluding Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan the Protestants obtained a two third majority in the region. When Protestants obtained the opportunity to form their own state with a large Catholic minority, they applied policies aiming to discourage Catholic participation in all of the state apparatus. Protestants created a system that would favor the Protestants while putting pressure on the Catholics and forcing them to the last point: armed counter-offense.

So the Unionists set about constructing an Orange and Protestant state with almost all political power and patronage in their own hands ... and operated an elaborate and comprehensive system of discrimination in housing and jobs which kept the minority in a position of permanent and hopeless inferiority (Farrell, 1980, p .81).

In July 1922 new measures were introduced to reduce the power of the Catholic minority. A local government bill was accepted which omitted the available system of proportional representation (PR) in the six counties at the local level. In addition after the bill, the local boundaries were redrawn for valorizing the votes of the Protestants and the elections were postponed till 1924 for implementations. What is more, when universal suffrage was accepted in all of Britain in 1945 by the labor government,

only Ulster retained restricted franchise for local government. The Stormont government adopted a more restrictive franchise called as “*Representation of the People Bill*” in 1946.

Some 10, 000 young married couples lost the vote in Belfast. The Bill also retained the extraordinary principle of company voting, whereby limited companies received up to six votes according to their rate able valuation, the votes to be exercised by the company directors (Farrell, 1980: 85)

The discriminative policies were also seen in rural councils. The 28 Unionist-controlled rural councils in 1951 were employing 218 non-manual workers of whom only 11, or five percent were Catholics. Catholics were better situated in lower-paid jobs compared to well-paid manual workers. Despite the fact that Catholics were in the poorer sections of the society, they were receiving fewer houses that were built by the municipalities since they should be controlled in some areas and more in some districts the allocation of houses was used as a tool to increase Protestant voters numbers. For elections to local councils, only home owning taxpayers could vote. Poorer Protestants were also affected but the majorities that were affected were Catholics. Property requirements changed the size of the local electorate. The number of voters that reached 900,000 for Westminster and Stormont elections, but for local elections, that number was about 600,000 (Tonge, 1998). Also regulations like the ‘Civil Authorities (Special Powers) *Act*’ empowering the authorities were of qualities that gave room to the use of arbitrary power...such as the possibility to outlaw organizations or to detain or intern people indefinitely without sending them to trial, seeing it as an offence the refusal of answering questions put by a policeman, if necessary blocking roads and bridges and evacuating or destroying houses and buildings (Farrell, 1980). In addition to set curfews, the will to establish exclusions

orders such as having the power to bar people from a remote area within the six counties in a manner that effectively blocked the right of movement and freedom to choose their living place was violated. In 1923 a further development occurred in Ulster, a regulation empowering the government, examine bank accounts and to seize bank deposits was accepted.

Employment was another area in which discrimination was applied. An example of that is the discrimination in industrial location decisions. Areas with Catholic majorities received only three quarters of the amount of the employment awards that were received by the Protestants between 1949 and 1963. The result was that a more industrialized east of Northern Ireland and a more rural west was formed throughout the years. Also discrimination in employment prospects can be given as an example. In 1972 almost one-third of Catholic males were unskilled, and the overall Catholic number of males that were unskilled was double the number of the Protestants. Finally discrimination in public sector appointments is seen in three ways. a- The security services that are of sectarian nature discouraged Catholics to join those governmental institutions.

The regular police, the RUC, were to have been one third Catholic but in 1922 Catholics were unlikely to join a force so much identified with the new state. Less than one sixth of the *new* force was Catholic, and the balance was made up by recruitment from the Specials... The Catholic proportion never increased and the Hunt Committee found that in 1969 only about eleven per cent of the force was Catholic. (Farrell, 1980: 96)

b- the civil service contained few Catholics within its ranks since the lower *echelons* of the working force were accessible only to them. c- In local councils led by Unionists, Catholics had difficulties to find jobs. Catholics were impeached to be

materially strong since they were forced to get the worst jobs, aimed to break the confidence of the Catholics by making them understand they had no way to win (Tonge, 1998).

3.4 Legitimization of the Repression in Ulster

After the partition, Protestants used their relatively better situations to discriminate against the Catholics of Ulster by becoming the hegemonic power in the area. Jonathan Tonge refers to an interview that gives the opinions of Protestants about the issue of discriminating against the other. Only 18% of the Protestants are admitting that Catholics were treated unfairly in Ulster.

Protestant superiority was seen as the natural order, justified by the need for eternal vigilance against suspect Catholics. Electoral hegemony for Unionists was not seen as unjust, but rather as a justifiable product of the creation of North Ireland, with its attendant demographical and religious balance (Tonge, 1998: 22)

Some factors are cited by Protestants that do not see the situation of Catholics as abnormal. They pursue that some factors created the position of the Catholics in Northern Ireland. Those factors were used to banalize the current situation of the Catholic minority in Ireland. At first it was claimed that it was impossible to enact racist laws in Northern Ireland as a result of the *Government of Ireland Act 1920*, but that approach misses the point that all discrimination acts can be effectuated in local levels since that treaty binds the national level. Tonge shows the existence of racial theories even at the academic level in Northern Ireland although laws exist to protect the minority.

In 1955, one academic asserted that Catholics often were inferior, if only in those personal qualities that make for success in competitive economic life. (Wilson, 1955: 208-9)...Such an argument suggested a greater economic competence amongst the Unionist population, based upon a combination of the Protestant work ethic and superior schooling (Tonge, 1998: 23).

The second point was that in local elections, manipulations to disenfranchise the Protestant proletariat existed. This situation was used to defend the view that those policies by their nature were not sectarian. Also the proportions of Catholics living in public houses were equal to Protestant. Both examples were used as pretexts that deny the economic difference between Catholics and Protestants. The proportion of poor Protestant people is smaller than the Catholic poor in fact. Also the number of Catholics is smaller compared to Protestants.

Third, it is claimed that Catholics have excluded themselves from society by not entering into the institutions of Ulster. Abstention from Stormont by the Nationalist party is used as a pretext. But those critics are missing the point that in a majoritarian polity the Nationalist party becomes useless since it has no power to affect the legislative process. Also communities have not developed, throughout the years, the means of meeting each other; since the Catholics that maintained the old Gaelic culture and the Protestant Anglican culture saw in that environment their beliefs juxtaposed and alien to each other.

Fourth it is claimed that as nationalists are disloyal, they have denied the existence of the Ulster state. Nationalists have excluded themselves from the social and political sphere by claiming that the Ulster state is illegitimate. This viewpoint also misses the

fact that as the institutions became unrepresentative they became illegitimate. Tonge claims that the Catholics have mostly persevered under the repressive policies of the Protestants by adopting a compliant behavior till the 1968's.

The explanation seemed to lie in a reaction against the violence of 1920-22. The Catholic minority had been defeated and cowed. They had no stomach for another round of violence and the vengeance it would bring upon them, and most of them were not even prepared to vote for people associated with violence (Farrell, 1980:100)

3.5 Challenges in Transforming the Irish Free State to the Irish Republic

Ulster in its formation process faced some important problems that shaped its policies. First, the Southern state from the beginning of the foundation of Ulster has developed a negative behavior towards its establishment since it was against the division of Ireland. Southerners saw the existence of Ulster as a continuation of British colonial rule, they had freed themselves but their brothers were still in captivity. Second, Protestants saw the hegemonic Catholic Church that existed in the Southern state, as a threat. For Unionists, events after the foundation of the Southern state are considered as the proof that they were right in terms of criticizing the position of the church in the state apparatus. Another controversial point is the difference of the identities that are vindicated by the states, one state is sponsoring the Gaelic identity whereas the other the Protestant British Identity. Both cultures are defending themselves against absorption. (Shannon, 1985) The Southern State asserted its Irish identity despite the continuing relations with Britain. Third, the existence of Ulster meant that the new state was unable and not powerful enough to control the Northeastern part of the island. As the Southern part saw Ulster in its sovereignty area the Northern state was seen as a threat to Southerners, as well as it shakes the memories of Irish people by

remembering their colonial days. Fourth, attempts to solve the economic problems that were especially important to the Southern state were not resolved, because of the reluctance of Ulster to develop a more cooperative approach towards its southern neighbor. Fifth, the constitution of 1937 that proclaimed the independence of the Irish state contained clauses that held the foundations of the state, which would reshape 1949, rejected the permanency of partition, leveled the position of the church. Separatism, Theocracy and Unity were the major themes in the South, under the 1937 Constitution it became an imperative to unite Ireland. This increased the level of fear in the North. In addition, the theocratic kind of apparatus of the Southern state also alienated the Northerners since those identified the newly formed state as “Papist”. Also the engagement of de Valera in protectionism had worsened the image of the South in Northerners eyes, by creating an impression of a state that is close to the world. Sixth, during the World War II Ireland remained neutral with the fear that if it aligned itself with Germany, Britain would invade them. As the naval ports of Ireland were of vital importance, Britain insisted on their use in exchange for giving back Northern Ireland to the Free Irish State, but de Valera did not trust the British government. The non-alignment with Britain in the war worried parents of the conscripts who became furious by thinking that their sons were fighting in the British army but their country was neutral. Seven, in the World War II, Northern Ireland was used for U.S army bases, which created an American sympathy towards Ulster, whereas, Free Ireland was closing all its capabilities to the United States of America and Britain. Ulster used that situation to improve its relation with Great Britain and USA. Eight, German planes bombed Ulster and caused important damages to

industrial installations of the region, which also created respect for Ulster in the eyes of London.

Belfast was brought fully into the war through the large-scale air attacks of 15-16 April and 4-5 May 1941. Some 900 people were killed in the first and 191 in the second, and half of Belfast's houses were destroyed or damaged...although morale was badly hit, nothing identified Northern Ireland so closely with experiences of London, Coventry, Clydebank, Plymouth, and other British cities as the blitz (Fraser, 2000: 23)

Nine, when the war ended, veterans returned to their countries. They were surprised to hear that Ireland had not contributed to their cause. Finally, as the south has weakened its ties with Britain and did not align itself with the British government, Unionists were reassured that the status of Northern Ireland could only be changed in Stormont. This was a serious blow to nationalists in Ulster, as well as to the government of Irish Free Republic since their policies had worsened the situation in the Northern Ireland issue (Tonge, 1998).

3.6 The Impact of World War II

When victory came in May 1945, Northern Ireland, owing to its cooperation with Britain, had secured its place (of course due to the lack of cooperation on the part of Eire also). The Ireland Act of June 1949 formally gave the promise of Britain to Ulster that it remains a dominion of His Majesty and Britain, and that decisions to change the status of it would require the approval of Stormont. In Ireland, a new party called as *Clann na Poblachta* was founded in July of 1946. De Valera called for early elections as result of which a new government comes to power. A year later, the Republic of Ireland left the Commonwealth. By 1949 the two jurisdictions of Ireland, contrary to southerners' wishes were further apart than the leaders of the era of

partition (1920-1922) could have imagined in constitutional terms. Irish Republicanism was successful in one aspect. It had achieved one of its main aspirations by separating itself from the British imperial system but its other hope of ending the partition, had become an unachievable dream. (Fraser, 2000)

As from 1922 until the fifties, violent street fights, mobs with the aim to destroy Catholic quarters, IRA bombings became routine in Ulster. Catholics who constituted more than 40 percent of the Ulster region had to live under the very repressive rule of the Protestants. Catholics were the exploited part of society with limited access to resources, because of ascriptive criteria's they were terrorized under--the monopolized action of the state to use violence-- successively. The repressive rule materialized in the form of policies such as denying public housing aid, well-paid jobs, all aiming to deny scarce resources of the region to Catholics. As Nager would emphasize through the split labor theory, in a setting of competence between two ethnic groups, the ethnic boundary will be reinforced and ethnic conflicts are encouraged. The repressive rule was legitimized through perceptual explanations that are taking root since tension turns itself into violence. That led to disillusionment on the part of Catholics who have started to lose their hope of unification by legal ways. Ulster was formally formed as the result of the Anglo-Irish treaty looked for windows of opportunity, as Bartkus would point at. As Gurr said, at that crucial moment communal groups tried to find a way to manifest their grievances. The choice would be made between exit, autonomy, access or control. The problem emerged there as Ulster was a small entity formed on racial basis, even the most modest condition was impossible for the Protestants to

grant to Catholics. So, as Buchanan puts forward in the remedial rights only theory, the Catholics have ethically obtained the right to secede, if not in all Ulster, in places where they form the majority, as also confirmed according to “associative group theory”.

Ireland first obtained the status of dominion and with the help of the tide of events (Windows of opportunity) has forced Britain to give in to its main goal; Independence. It was acquired in exchange for impartiality during the World War II. President de Valera thus managed to change Ireland’s position from autonomy to independence (exit) in its relations with Britain. The second wish of Ireland with Ulster, however seemed to be out of the question since Ulster has been able to solidify itself on its territory. But a major deficiency of Ulster was the existence of ethnic based political parties, which dominated the political arena. As Brown argued, that was a sign of “the tyranny of the majority” since minorities remain constantly powerless in the political sphere, an impasse for the Catholic minority. They were left with the option to consent to suppression or to start initiatives to break this vicious cycle.

Chapter IV

Decolonization and the Problem of Northern Ireland in the Post–Second World War Period

4.1 Characteristics of the Decolonization Period

From the 16th century to the 20th century Europeans defeated and captured one after another the other parts of the globe. But in the twentieth century the process was reversed on the global scene and one after another they started to free themselves from their oppressors. That period was called the period of de-colonization. It was characterized by:

1-the dismantling of formal political and economic controls over non-European states, including in this the abolition of such institutions as the concessions and treaty ports in China, the restrictions on tariffs and the extra-territorial rights once enjoyed by Europeans in Turkey, Iran, Thailand, China and elsewhere. 2-the dismantling of the “open economy” in colonial and semi-colonial states. 3-the changed character of Europe’s demographic expansion into Afro-Asia and the partial check to its cultural and intellectual influence.4-the open competition for international influence in areas once formally or informally reserved to a particular colonial or great power (Darwin, 1988:16)

All these developments did not in reality end the hegemony of the European powers since they had accumulated so much throughout the centuries, a lot of things that could not be easily returned to the colonized countries. (Lloyd, 1996) What happened was at most a humiliation that didn’t last long. Those can be exemplified as:

Secondly the economic meaning of decolonization, therefore has not been the collapse of “imperialist exploitation” but rather the rise of the branch plant and the multi-national company which could trade safely inside the defenses of the closed economy, largely immune from the hostility displayed by post-colonial governments to foreign enterprise proper (Darwin, 1988:15)

The dismantling of the open economy has not greatly changed since the closed economy opened the gap between the rich and the poor countries, and the world turned out to be the Northern rich and the Southern poor. Only the oil rich countries had escaped from that trend and became richer. In some cases such as in Algeria, the Belgian Congo and Angola, the end of colonial rule meant the evacuation of almost the entire foreign population. Only in South Africa could Europeans live in an elevated social position that was seen as their birthright before in the former colonies. Europeans were most humiliated in that manner since in the countries where some Europeans preferred to stay they had to content themselves with the status of guest-if not attacked by people who wanted revenge-they lost their privileges. The last point is that the ex-colonies have become the object of an open competition. Was that not what the great powers had aimed to prevent in the colonial era?

4.2 British de-colonization and the Commonwealth Issues:

Britain that accomplished its decolonization in the period following the Second World War has some major differences from the other European powers. John Darwin claims that the British decolonization differs from other European cases in three aspects: 1- Britain mostly decolonized itself gradually in the years between 1783-1914. As an example the Thirteen Colonies were granted independence and the British colonies in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa all received almost complete

internal autonomy after 1850. “In the British colonies the loosening of constitutional ties was accompanied by the reinforcement of economic, social and cultural bonds through greater trade, investment and migration” (Darwin, 1988:6).

Britain had realized earlier than its European counterparts what was happening and envisaged a system in which it could pursue its vital interests by the formation of some legal mechanisms that transformed the empire to a kind of royal federation. All that was done with a certain plan that was accepted by the nobility and the mercantilists and coordinated by the Colonial Office.² Britain was sharing the same advantages with the other European nations in terms of economic and financial relations to third parties. So it was in a more advantageous position compared to other European states since it had also its own colonies that no one could use for its own interests.³ Britain preferred not to use the method of direct colonial rule on unnecessary occasions but rather chose to “influence, persuade, inveigle (by economic benefits) or frighten local rulers into cooperation with them” (Darwin, 1988:7).

At the end of the Second World War, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, Britain had to abandon its imperial possession of Palestine, which was under British mandate, and dismantle their informal standing on Egypt (Lloyd, 1996). What is more as the British were withdrawing from Greece, the responsibility to defend Greece and its neighbor Turkey was left to the United States. As the number of independent countries increased, the number of countries participating in the British Commonwealth arrangement was increasing too. The increase in the number in fact

was nothing more than an illusion since in the 1950s there were more members than in the 1920s but less cohesion existed in terms of producing common policies between the members (Lloyd, 1996). But the increase in the number had a positive side for Britain, that of being able to pursue an imperial policy without being hurt too much despite the losses of some advantages in many parts of the globe and the loosening of the leadership position against its allies of the war, the United States and the Soviet Union. Britain, following Indian independence, focused in that period on the issue of training the remaining colonies with the help of the Colonial Office agency. For a step-by-step devolution of powers that could guarantee that those colonies could rule themselves in the near future and to not permit any infringement from other countries (within and outside the commonwealth) the British government applied a program that was strictly controlling the stages of progress to independence. The term “*Dominion status*” was still used in those days to describe the final stage that a colony had reached, which equalized the status of independence plus membership in the Commonwealth (Darwin, 1988).

In the 1960's it became clear that the British Empire was coming to an end, that a dignified process of expanding the Commonwealth with the remaining colonies through a qualifying period in a meritorious manner was over. The British taxpayers were not willing to spend money on the colonies that they had acquired at very low costs. The British governments as part of the devolvement process and in order not to pay the cost of maintaining law and order, once a government was established in the colonies charged those expenses and responsibilities to the localities. Those gestures

made easier the formulation of a policy of withdrawal from the colonies since the heavy spending to retain those places was seen as malicious by the general public. The 1961 Commonwealth conference showed how embarrassing was the idea to manage the older colonies, the new independent states within the Commonwealth arrangement.

When the Commonwealth Prime ministers met for their 1961 conference they had to consider South Africa's position as a republic; as a result of the Indian precedent it had become accepted that a formal application for renewed membership should be made when a member became a republic and this gave the Asian and African members of the Commonwealth, supported by Canada, an opportunity to insist that the conference *communiqué* must include a condemnation of apartheid (Lloyd, 1996: 343)

Offended by those gestures, South Africa quickly withdrew its application and ended its membership of the Commonwealth when it proclaimed itself as a republic in May.

The issue of race was at the center of discussions in the late 1950's.

Until then it had been regarded as perfectly reasonable to attribute national success or failure to racial differences, and it was often assumed almost as a matter of course that white people were racially (or genetically) superior to everyone else. In a sense the apartheid legislation had simply codified a view that had been widely held for a long time (Lloyd, 1996: 343)

These ideas were accepted at such a level by the colonizing countries that a person like Hobson known as a leftist also had used the racist rhetoric shows Lloyd. He wrote in his book, *Confessions of an Economic Heretic* (1938) that “ a situation like the present in which lower stocks and lower races displace higher races and higher stocks would denote a human retrogression” (Lloyd, 1996:343). The devastating experience of Hitler leading Germany changed this accepted situation and the idea of seeing

Asians or Africans inherently inferior waned. But it was still argued that they were lacking the experience for government in order to become independent.

Before the 1960's, policies based on the differences in citizenship rights were non-existent for British subjects. The subjects of the monarch had experienced different laws that varied from place to place. In the nineteenth century, in some places, the inhabitants still did not enjoy the full rights of British subjects. In the self-governing colonies there existed provisions that empowered the administrations to exclude undesirable British subjects. People from the poorer parts of the empire were not permitted to change their residence area to obstruct them to undercut wage rates. Englishmen and Scotsmen that took part in establishing trade unions were chased from South Africa and Canada under the pretext of participating in revolutionary activities.

The movement of population was another problem for Britain. By 1950, immigrants from the West Indies were brought up to think that Britain was also their "home". They easily understood that England was not their home. By the late 1950's a new flow of 50,000 immigrants per year from India and Pakistan started to come. By 1961 as that number reached a 100,000 people per year, for that the *Commonwealth Immigration Act* was introduced. That law was widely criticized as limiting the free movement of labor as well as of being against the unity of the Commonwealth.

As time passed, the idea that some colonies were too poor or small to gain independence was abandoned, if not the existence of that entity is endangered by its neighbors. The appointment of Macleod as Secretary for the Colonies in October 1959 by Macmillan is accepted as a turning point in Commonwealth affairs since that accelerated the process of imperial departure from the remaining colonies. By 1961 it was clear enough that Britain was trying to withdraw itself with a minimum cost to Britain and the British taxpayer.

By the 60's the Commonwealth countries had started to change their position towards Britain from any special commitment to a relation that would increase their benefits. As Britain had applied for partial membership to the European Economic Community and was rejected in 1958, it applied for a second time for full membership and was again rejected due to vetoing by France. The Commonwealth countries felt relieved but were deeply shocked to see that the newly formed European Community was more unified than the Commonwealth countries. In 1965, a secretary-general and a staff were established in London to ameliorate that situation. At first Commonwealth conferences started as meetings of Prime Ministers in an environment of tolerance and respect. As time passed, the new members realized that their membership was not beneficial to them since rather an environment of consensus was pushing them to compromise on issues that in normal conditions they would not and by that they understood that their interests could not be the same as Britain.

Another conference was held in Singapore in 1971, in the same year Britain successfully concluded its negotiations to enter the European Community. The conference was important since the relations between the Commonwealth countries were worsened since a number of attempts to form a federation had failed. This had shown that a number of countries, which have common frontiers, could have friendly relationships but closer association was not possible any more. As members of the Commonwealth understood that the British market was not going to be open as before to their exports, they started to participate or to form new economic associations, for example Canada agreed to set up a North American Free Trade Area with the United States in the 1980's. Also other Commonwealth exporters widened and diversified their markets during the 1960s to be ready for the admission of Britain to the European Community.

4.3 Problem of Northern Ireland after the War

Ireland throughout the war chose to stay neutral but about 60,000 Irish citizens joined the British armed forces and hundreds of thousands of Irishmen worked in British weaponry plants. When German planes landed in Ireland their pilots were interned, but when British and American planes touched the ground they were permitted to rejoin their units in Ulster. As opposed to the Irish government many members of the IRA participated in sabotage efforts against the British war machinery. IRA members believed that a German victory could lead to a unified Ireland once again. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization by different means has tried to break the neutrality of Ireland but was not successful in that respect (Irvine, 1991).

In the first national elections in 1948 the government changed hands after 16 years *Fianna Fail*²⁰ was ousted from office by a coalition from 10 *Clann na Poblachta*²¹ with 31 *Fine Gael*, 19 *Labor*²² and 7 members from Clann na Talmhan (Farmer's party) and James Dillon as an independent deputy. John Costello, Chairman of Fine Gael became *Taoiseach*, the President of Eire. Costello while visiting Canada proclaimed the official end of the Free State and the beginning of the Irish Republic, in other words the withdrawal of Ireland from the Commonwealth. In 1959 *Sean Lemass* became the new parliamentary leader of Fianna Fail and Taoiseach by replacing De Valera. Lemass pursued a new economical program by abandoning the self-reliance policies that were pursued from the formation of the Irish state till the end of the 1950's. The new policies that were aiming at bringing foreign investment to the country were successful and changed the profile of the country. Between the years of 1962 and 1972, Irish exports rose by 271 percent. New industries made their appearance such as synthetic textiles, electrical machinery, ship and boat building.. etc

²⁰ *Fianna Fail (FF)*: Political party formed by De Valera in 1926 when he broke away from Sinn Fein in order to enter the Free State Dail. Fianna Fail's policies were ostensibly mildly radical and republican and most of the former Sinn Fein TDs joined it. De Valera got into power in 1932 and Fianna Fail remained in power from then until 1973 with only two short breaks from 1948 to 1951 and from 1954 to 1957....(Fianna Fail) has long since dropped any pretension to radicalism or Republicanism (Farrell, 1980: 353).

²¹ *Clann na Poblachta (CnaP)*: A populist Republican party in the South. Founded by Sean Mc Bride in 1946 it included many ex-IRA men and took substantial support from Fianna Fail while its radical social programme attracted left-wingers. Clann na Poblachta won 10 seats in the 1948 Southern election and formed a Coalition government with Fine Gael and Labour. The Coalition collapsed in 1951 over a radical health scheme proposed by CnaP Minister Noel Browne. The party won only two seats in the 1951 election. It helped to support another Coalition government in 1954 but never recovered from the 1951 debacle and was finally dissolved in 1965 (Farrell, 1980: 352).

²² *Irish Labour Party (IrLP)*: the official trade-union based social democratic party in the South. Although it traces its origins to James Connolly and has retained a radical fringe over the years, it has always been solidly respectable and constitutionalist. It provided a 'loyal opposition' in the Dail during the civil war and has formed a Coalition government with the conservative Fine Gael party on three occasions (Farrell, 1980: 354).

From 1961 to 1971, agricultural employment declined from 371,000 to 274,000; a drop of 25 percent. In contrast the number of people involved in industrial production increased by about 25 percent, 187,000 to 233,000. During this period industry created 15,000 new jobs...Inflation drives up the cost of living and sex mores are changing. The New Irish life style has challenged traditional Catholic values and authority...Liberated men and women demand a greater secularization of Irish society (McCaffrey, 1979: 171).

Ireland has effected important changes in its economy but still as the dependence on foreign markets, there is a continuous risks that a large-scale recession or depression in other countries could lead to a run over of foreign capital. What is more, prosperity in the new economy was not absorbed equally by everyone; rather the middle classes have profited from the situation, whereas the poor suffer from the inflation.

In terms of foreign policy the Irish governments had tried to gain as much as possible from the rivalry between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R by accommodating itself to shifting economic cultural and social environments.

After the Soviet Union withdrew its objections, Ireland became a member of the United Nations in 1956. In New York...Irish diplomats condemned imperialism and spoke as representatives of Third World victims of colonialism...Their conduct at the United Nations often infuriated Catholic bishops in Ireland...particularly their open-minded position in regard to the admission of Red China into the international organization (McCaffrey, 1979: 172-3).

Another issue on foreign affairs is the Common Market issue that Ireland joined on 1 January 1973 with a popular voting, a referendum. Ireland applied to the Common Market in order not to lose in the competition against Britain and to receive funds for development, and the possibility to enter in new markets where to export its own goods (Jackson, 1999).

With her entry into the common market, Ireland's foreign policy stance has shifted from Third World to European, with attention directed more to Brussels

than to the United Nations in New York. Ireland since 1958 has turned her back on Irish–Ireland and/or Catholic Ireland isolationism (McCaffrey, 1979: 173).

On internal affairs an important issue was the situation of the Protestants living in the Southern part of the isle. The Protestant majorities in the North from time to time criticized the situation of their brothers in the South, and blamed the Catholic state of the South.

Pressure upon Protestants in southern Ireland came not from the government but from the Catholic Church. In the decades before Vatican Council II (1962–65), the Catholic Church held strictly to the rule that if a Catholic were marrying a non-Catholic, there could not be a Catholic wedding ceremony unless the non-Catholic first promised in writing that all children born of the marriage would be brought up as Catholics. Because many Protestants acceded to this demand, Protestants ministers watched in sadness as the number of their younger communicants steadily declined through intermarriage with Catholics (Shannon, 1985: 15).

After the Second World War, Catholics in Northern Ireland understood that neither the IRA led violence nor the politicians of the Southern part could unite in the foreseeable future the two parts of Ireland (Tonge, 1998). They also saw that the possibilities given by the British Labor government, as welfare state fundings, were the sole way to improve their material conditions. A 1947 British education act gave the opportunity to enjoy the secondary education without payment. That event increased the education level of the Catholics who started to think of living in Ulster as first-class citizens rather than to force the Ulster state to collapse for unification with the Free State. That change in attitude resulted in the failure of an IRA campaign between 1956–1962 since it became difficult to recruit volunteers for fighting and because of the cooperation of police of both of the states of the Island (Irvine, 1991). The policies of president Lemass in the Republic had also affected the situation, when Ireland fully concentrated on development rather than the Northern Ireland issue the

terrorist organization had experienced difficulties of organization and funding...etc. What is more in January and February 1965 the Prime Ministers, Terence O' Neill and Sean Lemass met each other and discussions started between the two governments in issues of economics and mutual concern.

The phase of slow change was cut off with the beginning of some Civil Rights movements' agitations in 1968. Those movements copied the precedents set by the civil rights movements of the U.S.A. In 1967 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was formed in order to force the system to give equal citizenship, rights and opportunities to the people living in Ulster (Farrell, 1980). Several groups joined and started a march, singing songs of the American civil rights movement. The Royal Ulster Constabulary, B-specials and Protestant mobs, attacked those groups. The Ulster president encouraged by the Labor government of Westminster decided to make improvements to the issue of civil rights and social justice but was prevented by fanatics of the Orange Order who were guided by persons like the Reverend Ian Paisley²³ and politicians such as William Craig²⁴. In February 1969 to counter a

²³ Rev. Ian Paisley 1926 - : Loyalist politician. Protestant fundamentalist minister. Son of a Baptist minister and ordained by his father in 1946. Founded breakaway Free Presbyterian Church in 1951 and is now perpetual Moderator of it. Founded Ulster Protestant Action in early 1960's, led extra-parliamentary opposition to Terence O' Neill in late 60's and served two short jail terms. MP for Bannside at Stormont 1970-73. MP for N.Antrim at Westminster 1970 to date. Elected as Protestant Unionist but founded Democratic Unionist Party in 1971, and joined William Craig and Harry West in United Ulster Unionist Coalition in 1974. Member of Northern Ireland Assembly 1973-76 Elected Euro-MP June 1979. (Farrell, 1980, p.347)

²⁴ William Craig 1924 - : Loyalist leader. Solicitor and MP for Larne at Stormont 1960-73. Unionist Chief Whip 1962-63. Held various ministries 1963-68. Dismissed from ministry of home affairs in 1968. Set up hard-line Unionist, Ulster Vanguard, later Vanguard Unionist Party, 1972. Member of Northern Ireland Assembly 1973-75. Mp for East Belfast at Westminster, 1974 to 1979. Extreme right-winger, closely associated with Loyalist Para-military groups. Member of Orange Order. (Farrell, 1980, p.339-40).

hostile motion O' Neill dissolved the parliament and choose candidates that were loyal to his reform policies. In the districts where he was elected with an overwhelming majority two opponents entered against him .The first person was the Reverend Ian Paisley. The second candidate to oppose him was Michael Farrell.

Michael Farrell, a Catholic by birth but a Trotskyite by conviction, who had been prominent in the civil rights marches and whose aim was to divide the Catholic vote and weaken O'Neill. Farrell...in the radical wing of the civil rights movement, wanted revolution, not reform. (V.Shannon, 1985: 19).

When the election results were released O' Neill had won with a slight majority by gaining 7,700 votes to Paisley's 6,300 and Farrell's 2,300. The winning margin was so narrow that the prestige of O'Neill was without doubt damaged. Finally two months later, O' Neill resigned from his office. The peaceful marches were forgotten again and violence reappeared in the scene in the "marching season".

Encouraged by police apathy, and sometimes support, Protestant mobs forced Derry and Belfast Catholics to retreat into barricaded ghettos. During the civil rights phase of the Ulster crisis, the IRA kept a low profile; promoting civil liberties as a strategy mobilize and radicalize Catholic ghetto communities. In 1969, Protestant violence revived the IRA as a Catholic defense force, and Catholics welcomed IRA protection (McCaffrey, 1979: 181).

As the IRA was brought back in life and evidently in action, the organization split into two wings: the Official and Provisional IRA's. The split was the outcome of a decision of the leadership to downgrade military action and to not continue the policy of abstentionism from Stormont.

This downgrading of the military in favor of the political was too much for the traditionalist militarists in the movement. In January 1970 at the Sinn Fein ard-fheis (conference) they formed the *Provisional* IRA as a breakaway organization from what now became known as the *Official* IRA (Tonge, 1998: 42).

Both groupings focused on different tactics that would serve for their own purposes. The most important group appeared as the provisional IRA:

Appealing to the tradition of Irish resistance in arms to British rule, proclaimed the necessity of violent action to end what it called the British occupation of Northern Ireland. It also used socialist terminology and at times a Marxist or near-Marxist interpretation of the Ulster situation, but the nationalist element has on the whole been dominant and it has been this grouping, which has been most involved in the campaign of violence (Irvine, 1991, p.116–117)

In August 1969 the British government sent troops to Northern Ireland to reinstall peace and order (Bew, 1990). A contingent of 6,000 British troops was sent to be deployed in Belfast and Derry. Hitherto the British army used not to intervene in local events and were minor in numbers. But this time they came and were numerous than at other times. They were welcomed by Catholics who saw in them a role of protector against Protestant mobs and a police force believed hostile to them. But this did not last long and struggle between the British army and the Catholics became routinized. The initial friendliness of the Catholics ceased because the population was disappointed to see that some fundamental changes could not be achieved (Shannon, 1990). The disappointment turned to frustration for which the army was the obvious target since the army was identified with the *status quo*. The persistent traditional nationalism of Catholics was that the British army was the engine of the alien domination (Fraser, 2000). Following the resignation of O'Neill, there were by-elections for Stormont in which Paisley and another fundamentalist clergyman fueled the existing tension between the two communities.

In June 1970 during the general elections for the United Kingdom parliament, serious outbreaks occurred and finally the British army entered the Catholic Falls Road in an attempt to find hidden arms. The British army imposed a curfew in the Falls Road area where bombs were used against civilians. Later, during confrontations four

civilians were shot. After the summer of 1970, the IRA started a new campaign of violence in which the organization seemed to find fresh recruits more easily than before (Tonge, 1998). To counter this new wave of terrorism, the Stormont administration reintroduced in August 1971 the application of ‘internment without trial of suspected persons’. In accordance with the operations of the Army and the police there developed, between the years of 1971–74, a series of sectarian murders believed to have been performed by clandestine Para–militaries. On Sunday, January 30, 1972, the event labeled as “Bloody Sunday” occurred. British paratroopers killed fourteen Catholics in a protest demonstration. After that event the level of terror increased in such proportions between IRA and the Ulster Defence Association²⁵ (UDA) that in March 1972, the Conservative Government suspended the authority of the Northern Ireland government for a period of one year by taking the 6 counties under direct British rule.

The immediate consequence was the Resignation of Faulkner’s government, the suspension of the Stormont parliament, the appointment of a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland with a seat in the cabinet. The province was now virtually in total under the control of Westminster -the phase known as direct rule- (Irvine, 1991: 119).

But the violence in Ulster could not be stopped, neither be contained. In June, the IRA offered a ceasefire with the desire to meet British ministers. Those were accepted after hesitations but did not serve any purpose and violence restarted. An incident known as

²⁵ Ulster Defence Association: Hard–line Loyalist Para–military group formed at the end of 1971 out of existing ‘defence’ groups. Staged a series of mass rallies of masked and uniformed men early in 1972. The UDA is heavily armed and has been mainly responsible for the assassination campaign against Catholic civilians between 1972-1975. It is also heavily involved in gangsterism and protection rackets, and a number of its leaders have been killed or wounded in internecine struggles. The UDA is closely linked with William Craig’s Vanguard party and provided the muscle for the UWC ‘strikes’ in May 1974 and 1977 (Farrell, 1980: 361).

“Bloody Friday” happened after that. After some incidents that happened in the Irish republic, the *emergency powers law* was declared and many IRA members were put on trial since it was believed that violence that was transferred from the Northern Ireland area had the potential to destroy liberal democracy in the republic and that foreign investors should not be scared (Jackson, 1999).

In 1972 something very important happened in Ireland. After long debates about the Ulster issue, guided by intellectuals, some decisions were taken to create conditions that would cease the dividedness of Ireland. At first a national referendum removed the special status of the Catholic Church from the constitution (Article 44), the government raised social benefits to a level comparable to that of Britain. Another important decision was that Irish has ceased to be a requirement for secondary school and for all civil service appointments. What is more, the Supreme Constitutional court ruled unconstitutional the laws that were prohibiting the sale of birth control devices.

In 1972 a green paper called *The Future of Northern Ireland* was published aimed to put suggestions for irresolvable issues in Northern Ireland (Shannon, 1985). That was done with the collaboration of the Secretary of State and the British government in order to fill the gap of the political actors that appeared with the abolition of Stormont. In the Green Paper:

Political parties and groups put forward suggestions, ranging from that of Ulster Unionist party for a revival of a local parliament and administration with some superficial changes, to that of the SDLP which advocated joint sovereignty of Great Britain and the Irish Republic over Northern Ireland as a transition stage towards unity by consent of the whole Island; between these two a various range of intermediate options was put forward (Irvine, 1991: 121).

The Westminster government in accordance with the Green paper formulated a proposal aiming to form a devolved government. That had to be formed out of an eighty-seat parliament constituted with proportional representation and a cabinet shaped by the different parties in proportion to their strength. The process was aimed at adding Catholics in the governance. Shared responsibilities with Catholics alarmed the hard-line Unionists led by Paisley but the 1973 elections showed that the majority favored the arrangements (Wichert, 1991). The SDLP obtained 19 seats, the Alliance (liberal Unionist party) 8, the main Ulster Unionist party under Brian Faulkner 23 and various extreme Unionist groups 27 seats. The first meeting of the parliament was unsuccessful because of the disruption caused by the extreme groups. That event was followed by talks between the British and Irish governments and led to the Sunningdale Conference. The conference in December 1973 was held between the Official Unionists, SDLP, Alliance parties and the British and Irish governments.

The Unionist and the British government wanted the Irish government to guarantee the new arrangement in the north and to lay to rest the ghost that Ireland could somehow be unified by force against the will of the majority of the people in the north...The Sunningdale Agreement includes a declaration by the Irish government that it “fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change in that status”(Shannon, 1985: 23)

An agreement was reached to form a power-sharing executive for Northern Ireland made up of six Faulkner Unionists, five SDLP and one Alliance member. There was to be formed a *Council of Ireland* acting on unanimity as a consultative agency in the fields of natural resources, agriculture trade and industry, tourism, roads and transport, public health, and culture and arts.

The Dublin government and the SDLP, both mindful of the nationalist emotions of their respective constituencies wanted some all-Ireland institution created that would demonstrate that they were making progress, however slowly and modestly, toward the ideal of national unity. Faulkner agreed to a two-level political structure. There was to be Council of Ireland made up of cabinet ministers from Belfast and Dublin who, with the aid of a small permanent staff, would seek to harmonize policies and laws relating to political terrorism (Shannon, 1985: 24)

An issue that stayed unresolved was the issue of cooperation on terrorism; more specifically the Unionist and Westminster governments wanted a treaty requiring Dublin to extradite suspects to the North. This couldn't be achieved for various reasons. One was, Ireland pressing a case in the European Court of Human Rights against Britain that the British government was guilty of religious discrimination and torture. The new executive started its duty at the beginning of 1974, with Brian Faulkner as the Prime Minister and Gerry Fitt of the SDLP as his deputy.

When the new power-sharing executive took office in January 1974, it looked on the surface as if twenty months of Direct Rule had been successful: the protestants appeared to have accepted a compromise, the Catholics seemed to have voted for constitutional politics, violence had declined considerably since the previous year and there appeared to be a prospect of working out a political solution (Wichert, 1991:165)

Faulkner knew he could dismiss these all-Ireland arrangements as nonsense since the Consultative assembly and the permanent secretariat could do nothing without the explicit approval of the Belfast government but to many of the Unionist voters these were seen as the institutions of a united Ireland. A third of the electorate had given its vote to non-Faulknerite Unionism. Neither Protestant, nor Catholic paramilitaries had handed in their weapons and the existence of a *Council of Ireland* enraged loyalists and didn't calm the extreme Catholic nationalists. After the executive took office in January 1974, the Ulster Unionist Council rejected the Sunningdale agreement and

Brian Faulkner had to resign as leader of the Unionist Party and the movement split into two: The Faulknerite Ulster Unionist Party and the United Ulster Unionist Coalition (UUUC). In February 1974 a surprise general election was called. The Faulkner Unionists lost all of its twelve seats in the British House of Commons whereas enemies of the power-sharing arrangement won eleven seats. The only power-sharing supporter to be elected was Gerry Fitt in Catholic West Belfast .If the elections had been conducted with proportional representation voting, the power-sharing supporters would have won many more votes and then representation. In May 1974 a new organization known as the Ulster Workers Council announced a general strike on May 14.

The leaders were members of the Protestant working class...they represented a genuine revolt from the shop floor and the streets by people who believed that aristocratic landlords and wealthy businessmen who had led the Unionist party for more than fifty years were betraying Protestantism and Ulster (Shannon, 1985, p.26).

The objectives of the general strike were the abrogation of the Sunningdale Agreement and new elections to the new assembly. The political strikes that were held one year earlier --for ending direct rule-- were unsuccessful but this time Protestant paramilitary gangs were better organized and forced people to participate in the strike by violent methods. The strike could not be stopped because the police was not controlled by the executive but from London. The policeman simply stood aside from the affair and strikers after two weeks succeeded in shutting down the electric power stations so to paralyze the province. The executive resigned. Different groups learned a lot from this affair. The British government understood that an external attack on the authority of

parliament had been successful so British rulers understood that no solution could be imposed from outside Ulster (Wichert, 1991).

After those events, Faulkner lost his standing and power in the Unionist party for failing to pay enough attention to the opinion of the grass roots. The Unionists understood with that event the potential of the UDA had to mobilize working-class support. The SDLP leadership understood that power sharing in Northern Ireland was a possible and also a desirable goal that perhaps could be achieved once again in the future. The Catholic population was once again intimidated and their doubt about the possibility of reform and compromise from the unionist community was shaken. The IRA that provided essential services to the Catholic minority during the strike, was happy to strengthen its ties with the population once again. Protestant workers who had participated in the strike “realized that the ‘spirit of 1912’ was not dead and that they could still rebel against British politics”(Wichert, 1991: 168).

The era after the World War II, known as the decolonization period, saw the emergence of numerous states on the international scene. Many states used the nationalistic primary rhetoric of self-determination. The UN General Assembly by adopting on December 14, 1960 the resolution number 1514 paved the way for colonies to freed themselves from their oppressors. But as time passed the principles of ‘self-determination’ and ‘sovereignty’ clashed with the principle of ‘territorial integrity’. Major powers disagreed to the implementation of the resolution to non-colonial settings.

A second global trend in the world was the civil rights movements that changed the racial policies of the United States of America (USA). That event had led to the formation of civil rights movements employing peaceful, non-violent methods for claiming the nullification of grievances, which existed because of the political systems. In Ulster the same methods were tried by the Catholic minority but were countered by violent methods by the sectarian Ulster policing forces and evidently the Orange Order. The state was not willing to discuss the options that Gurr (2000) claimed to exist. That situation helped the radical groups such as the IRA to recruit new members for fighting the Protestant state apparatus, and, if possible, to destroy it.

At the same time in the Southern state, the events that Buchanan (1998) redouted, occurred. With the secession of Ulster from the Irish state, the Protestants who lived in the South became a minority of 10% of the Southern population. Although the Irish Republic didn't explicitly exert pressures on the minority, the minority fell to 3% of the population. This helped for the perceptual explanations of radical Protestant leaders of the North that fueled constantly the risk of devastation by the Catholic majority if one day unification occurs. This brought Britain again in Northern Ireland and helped the Catholic militants to claim that they were fighting a war of colonial liberation.

The policies of the new prime minister of Ireland, Lemass affected the Catholic state to expose itself to the outside world. The policies that were applied focused on developing the country rather than trying to solve the Northern Ireland issue. But

those policies brought together Terence O'Neill and Sean Lemass, the two prime ministers of the respective states of Ireland, in 1965. This was an important event, which led in the future the prospects for dealing the Northern Ireland issue between the governments of Ireland as well as Britain. The Sunningdale conference ending with an agreement that suggested devolution of power for Northern Ireland led to a power-sharing executive that had to resign as a result of the grass-roots demonstrations that plagued the country. The elite of Ulster could not apply the treaty since the Protestant working class, supplemented by paramilitaries, resisted the implementation of the treaty because of the fear of being deprived of their comparative advantage against the Catholics. So in that case, too, the competition for resources set the agenda, resulting in the deception and fear of Catholics to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Chapter V

Structural Changes In Northern Ireland From The 1970's To The Present Times.

Irish public life-mostly in the republic and later in the relations between Ireland and Ulster-from the early 1970's through the mid 1990's was mainly affected by three events: the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, membership of the European Economic Community (in 1973), and the endless turmoil in Northern Ireland.

5.1 Economics reflected on politics

The oil crises of the 1970's had important results for the region: the 1973 crisis had quadrupled the price of oil and the hikes of 1979 had amplified the results of the prior crisis. The Irish economy was already in a fragile situation when the crisis came.

Even before the oil crisis, the Fianna Fail Minister of Finance, George Colley, had decided to break a fundamental convention of Irish public finance in drawing up his plans for 1972-by failing to balance the current budget of the state and permitting a projected current account deficit of around 1,3 percent of GNP.... By 1974 the current deficit had reached 92 million Pound, or 3,1 per cent of GNP; and in 1975, the nadir of Irish public finance, this deficit had swollen to just under 259 million pound, or close to 7 percent of GNP (Jackson, 1999: 378)

Some policies of stabilization were applied to bring the current account deficit under control but those policies only encouraged projections of growth since increasing

public spending in order to stimulate the economy had increased the amount of public deficit.

Once again, in 1973, it was oil, which converted a dangerous situation within the public finance into cataclysm: the oil crisis of 1979 added a crucial external dimension to the home-grown inflationary pressures. By 1979 the Irish balance of payments deficit was 10.1 percent of GNP; and, though there was a slight recovery in 1980, this figure slipped to 12.5 percent in 1981. By December 1992 the accumulated debt of the state had reached 12 billion pound (Jackson, 1999: 379)

During the 1970's Keynesianism was applied in economics. The disastrous results of successive ministers of finance involved the accumulation of huge debts, so a continuous budgetary problem. The policies applied in the 1980's to calm the situation worked a little but the country became totally dependent on international markets. Thus meant that an international crisis of the stock markets could create grave problems for Ireland (Such as the collapse of international markets in 1987, the currency crisis of 1992). The irresponsible and partisan policies of the 1970 's were paid at high costs

It was their successors in the 1980s...who paid the price for this mixture of misjudgment and misplaced party loyalty. The cost involved the modification of certain fundamental attitudes and institutions within Irish political life (Jackson, 1999: 380)

In the 25 years between 1948 and 1973 only six changes of government occurred; while in the 25 years between 1973 and 1998 there were 12 such changes. What is more between 1989 and 1998, Fianna Fail was able to enter into coalitions with the Labor or the Progressive Democrats in order to acquire power. Economic pressures accompanied by international influence had an ideological impact on Irish politics. As the tax levels were increased, public spending reduced the middle classes who were taxed at source and especially the poor sections of the society that benefited from

welfare provisions and state expenditure suffered. Unemployment levels remained high in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching a level of 300,000 jobless (21 percent of the workforce). All those led to a growth of class politics in Ireland.

The economic crisis of the late 1980's was due to the misgovernance of the early years in the form of debts, as well the collapse of international stock markets that occurred in 1987 and after (Jackson, 1999). The economic pressures helped to the creation of a radical conservative party with the name of Progressive Democrats as well as to some new alignments within the mainstream political parties of Fianna Fail and Fianna Gael. Fianna Fail, which was known for its political populism and opportunism, had to review its policies in the late 1980s by accepting neo-liberal policies used in other suffering economies. Similarly Fianna Gael changed social-democratic emphases to a neo-liberal position. That situation was seen in the promise of the Fianna Gael leader FitzGerald -after the election defeat of 1987- to support Fianna Fail minority government if it applied the rigorous budgetary constraints of spending cuts and economic growth. The strategy known as the *Tallaght* remained in force until 1990.

5.2 Entry to the EEC and the problem of Northern Ireland

Ireland's interest in membership for the EEC was due to the crisis of confidence she was experiencing in the 1950's. This was ameliorated by the policies of Whitaker and Lemass that changed the culturally xenophobic and economically protectionist Irish guideline of governance. Ireland was willing to enter the community for several

reasons. In more immediate terms, membership was attractive because it promised to Ireland, immediate cash profits because of the Common Agricultural Policy that was formulated in 1963. Membership also meant the application of the wider economic and political goals of Lemass. Those included lowering tariffs and his “technocratic” approach to Irish partition (Jackson, 1999) Ireland’s application (as well as British application) was overturned in 1963 because of French suspicions that those applicants, if accepted as members, would act as American Trojan horses to conquer the fortress of European Civilization. When General de Gaulle retired from the French Presidency in 1969, the most important element to block Irish membership was eliminated. So negotiations restarted for British and Irish membership and with a referendum held on 10 May 1972, which approved Ireland’s admission. Irish membership was formally approved on 1 January 1973. The president that made structural changes for Irish admission, Lemass, died 18 months before seeing his dream realized: the admission.

From 1973 to 1991 Ireland received subventions from Brussels amounting to about 14 million pound. The Common Agriculture Policy due to its subsidiary mechanisms brought enormous benefits to Irish farmers whose income doubled in the first five years of Irish membership. Before 1991, 10.3 billion out of 14 billion pound given to Ireland was used in the agricultural sector. Although there was a real growth and diversification of the economy in late 1990s, the Irish economy still depended on the agricultural sector with a quarter of total export value coming from that sector in the beginning of the decade. Direct subventions from the Common Market decreased the

impact of the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s and helped to keep up Irish living standards. Membership of the EEC also underlined the attractiveness of Ireland to American investors. The arrival of European and American capital in the 1970s and 1980s had affected the overall form of Ireland's trading relationships: the historic commercial links between Ireland and Britain were gradually replaced by a more diverse web of economic partners (Jackson, 1999: 386).

Membership to the EEC has changed the nature of relationship between Ireland and Britain. Before the difference in per capita GDP between the two countries was largely in favor for Britain.

Disparities in power and wealth, combined with intimate cultural and economic bonds, made for a political relationship charged with British condescension and Irish defensiveness. Shared membership of the Community brought some oxygen into this fetid atmosphere: Ireland's economic links with Britain have grown more tenuous, while at the same time Irish interests within the European Union have often brought a strategic unity with the British (Jackson, 1999: 388)

Ireland was able to break its connection -established in 1826- with sterling in joining European Monetary system before Britain in 1979. What is more, Irish GDP per head overtook that of the British in 1997. As a result of this process of economic release the political relationship between Ireland and Britain inside the European Union has improved. Because of the mechanisms of the community, British and Irish bureaucrats had to work together in many issues, which brought an increased degree of understanding and sympathy than before (Jackson, 1999). Later, interests that coalesced in the European level shaped Anglo-Irish relations. The Fianna Gael leader FitzGerald in 1976 spelled out an example of that special relationship to the British Foreign Secretary, Tony Crosland. He argued that: "Irish interests lay in an

equilibrium between the three major powers of the EEC, and that a more active British role suited the Irish since it mitigated the threat of Franco-German domination”. (Jackson, 1999: 388)

Close British-Irish communication, formed as a result of interaction in European issues,” lay behind the radical initiative on Northern Ireland which began tentatively in 1981 and which culminated in the Anglo-Irish agreement (November 1985)” (Jackson, 1999: 388–89). The most important step for the crisis of Northern Ireland was made with Lemass’s creative redefinition of anti-partitionist strategy, to form cooperative institutions between the two Irish states in order to end partition. The renunciation of violence and imposition on Northern Ireland formed the foundations of the policies to be pursued in 1973, at the Sunningdale Conference, and in 1984-5 with the New Ireland Forum and the Anglo-Irish agreement.

5.3 The Armed struggle and the political side of the armed struggle

The collapse of the executive led the British government to install “direct rule” in Northern Ireland. For the past ten years, the region has been governed in a similar pattern of crown colony. A British cabinet minister, appointed as state minister by Westminster, and several junior ministers, take decisions in consultation with a civil bureaucracy. The people of Northern Ireland do not participate in electing the governing agencies. They are permitted only to vote for local councils, which have minor powers, and for the parliament in Westminster (Shannon, 1985: 28). 1974 to 1976 were considered as the years of the Protestant backlash. According to M. Smith

(1995) from the spring of 1972 the murdering of Catholic civilians increased, the so called “*Protestant Backlash*” started, in that year loyalists were responsible for 102 deaths through shootings and bombings. By 1977 total loyalist killings reached 531. According to Farrell, the main agencies operating the backlash were the UDA’s military wing, the Ulster Freedom Fighters²⁶, and the Ulster Volunteer Force²⁷. The members of those radical organizations tended to regard all Catholics as potential rebels. So their victims were Catholics who had nothing to do with the republican movement. (M.Smith, 1995) The main aim was to terrorize the Catholic population, to ‘choke-off’ or to not support the Provisionals (PIRA). The incidents had generated great fear and anxiety within the Catholic community. Unionists who had succeeded in dismissing the executive were ready to eradicate any remaining Catholic opposition. Many Unionist voters that were joyful with the collapse of the executive thought that the time had come for a better bargain with the British and the Catholic minority. But they quickly learned that what they had dreamed could not be so easily realized (Shannon, 1985: 27). The British government held elections for a new convention in order to force some change in the region, a better constitutional settlement. But that was impossible since the hard-liners, led by Paisley and Craig had obtained the majority of the seats in the new convention. Faulkner’s organization

²⁶Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) : An extreme Loyalist murder squad who announced their existence and their intention of killing Catholics in 1973. They claimed responsibility for the murder of an SDLP Senator in June 1973 and subsequently of many other Catholics. It is generally assumed that the UFF is simply a pseudonym for UDA murder gangs (Farrell, 1980: 362).

²⁷ Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 1966-75 : The old UVF disappeared after 1922, but in 1966 the name was revived by a small Loyalist group who murdered two Catholics that summer. They re-emerged to plant a series of bombs which toppled the Prime Minister Terence O’Neill in 1969, and since then the UVF has expanded into a large para-military organisation, more disciplined than the UDA but equally involved in sectarian killings. Despite occasional semi-radical utterances the UVF is violently anti-socialist and has connections with the British National Front Organisation. (Farrell, 1980: 364).

served nothing since he obtained devastating results and retired from politics. The majority of the convention voted for a return to the government form of the pre-1972 with only minor changes. The SDLP rejected that proposition and the British governments continued to veto its application. At the same time the Provisionals were placed in a dilemma: Loyalist killings were undermining PIRA's claim to be the defenders of the Catholic population. If PIRA failed to react to stop the attacks it risked losing much of its credibility amongst nationalists. Yet to respond in kind would confute the republican principle of non-sectarianism, which the movement had sought to observe in principle (M.Smith, 1995). The republican ideology in fact, was seen as non-sectarian, PIRA's attacks, were done mainly against the RUC and UDR²⁸. M. Smith (1995) argues that the PIRA units tried to avoid the killings of civilians since "the image of non-sectarianism" was necessary to prove to Protestants that a single nation would not be against their interests. Despite the rhetoric of the PIRA's leadership, it was clear that from the mid-1972s, those Provisional units had started to kill Protestants in the same manner as their loyalist counterparts. The participation of PIRA units in the sectarian war was a confirmation for many Protestants that a united Ireland would bring disaster for them and made them more resistant to such a prospect (Shannon, 1985). PIRA members by rule never gave importance to the Protestant tradition since those were considered as tools of British imperialism whose will to defend their interest would collapse when colonial patronage would be ineffective

²⁸ Ulster Defence Regiment : A local part-time military force established in 1970 to replace the B specials. Under British Army control, it was intended to be religiously mixed and only lightly armed. It was quickly infiltrated by Loyalist para-military groups and most of the Catholics left after the introduction of internment. By January 1974 its membership was over 97 per cent Protestant. At the same time Loyalist pressure has ensued that the UDR is now armed with self-loading rifles, sub-machine guns, Bren guns and Browning machine guns mounted on armoured cars. Its strength early in 1975 was about 8, 000 (Farrell, 1980: 361-362).

(M.Smith, 1995). As the Provisionals believed that the power to change the status was in the hands of British politicians in London, they diverted their military instrument to Britain. The main aim was to terrorize the British population, to create a feeling of insecurity in the populace in order to make feel them that they were never immune from the conflict in Northern Ireland. Wichert (1991) argues that it was believed that the feelings of insecurity would transform itself into political pressure for withdrawal since the *populace* would start to question the role of the British army in Ireland and whether the continuous British rule was inflaming the conflict. In late 1975 attacks were started in England, and especially the wealthy and influential members of society were intimidated in the belief that these people could brought the PIRA's message to the highest establishments

In late 1976 the I.R.A and the Protestant gunmen reached a truce after that the I.R.A violence had surpassed the loyalist one. In November 1979, new round of talks were started with political leaders under the leadership of Humphrey Atkins, Mrs. Thatcher's first minister for Northern Ireland .The talks under his leadership were unsuccessful. The basis for the failure of all political initiatives in the 1970s is to be found in the economic developments, which reinforced the political perceptions.

As the middle classes continued to do better, the consequences of the oil crisis and world over-capacity began to de-industrialize Northern Ireland. As a consequence the gap between the middle and the working classes grew ever wider and any attempt at political modernization of these low-income groups was forestalled by social and economic fears. It was therefore the respective working classes, which continued to force moderate political leaders on both sides into retrenchment and made moderate political progress impossible. The centuries-old tribal certainties of the extremist groups appeared to be safer for the majority of the population than the vagueness of middle-class politicians

who seemed to add political insecurities to the existing economic ones. (Wichert, 1991: 177-178).

The government's attempts to end economic discrimination with the implementation of the *Fair Employment Act of 1976* through the Fair Employment Agency was seen as counter-productive to end violence since every job given to a Catholic meant a loss for a Protestant. Wichert asserts that the implementation of the fair employment act particularly affected the Protestant working classes "since the legal end of discrimination against Catholics in employment effectively worked against the employment of Protestants"(1991:179). The increasing tension in the society made difficult the acceptance of the British and Irish proposals that power would be returned to Protestants only if they showed their willingness to share it with the Catholics. In the years of 1980 and 1981 the crisis known as the 'dirty protest' dominated the political sphere. Those were protests and hunger strikes led by the IRA prisoners who aimed to regain their "special category status" that recognized them as quasi-political prisoners.

Each death was marked by a huge funeral attended by thousands of sympathizers. Hunger strikes are an ancient tradition in Ireland. In Irish nationalist and revolutionary politics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, funerals were frequently transformed into political demonstrations. The sacrifices of the hunger strikers awakened dormant passions among many Irish people who were hostile to I.R.A violence. The martyrdom of the hunger strikers also reinvigorated the romance and fanaticism of the I.R.A legend. It helped attract fresh support, not only from the organization's traditional recruiting grounds -the West Belfast and Derry working-class neighborhoods- but also among college-educated, middle-class youths (Irvine, 1991: 129)

James Prior -who served from 1981 to 1984- as Secretary of State replaced Humphrey Atkins a month before the end of the hunger strike. Although that previous initiatives had failed, James Prior believed that a constitutional solution could be found. He

suggested a model that came to be known as the '*rolling devolution*'. By that, another assembly had to be formed that would function as a consultative agency -with the rights to scrutinize legislation- in the beginning for Northern Ireland. The role could be extended to include the supervision of government departments of Northern Ireland and finally to a legislative function if cross-community could be reached. The necessary legislation to enable the application of the plan was passed from the Westminster and elections were held in October 1982 by a proportional representation system for a 78-seat assembly.

Wichert (1991) argues that a significant change in Northern Ireland between 1981-84 was the coming-back of Sinn Fein to electoral politics. Those years were important for the Provisionals since they had obtained victories in elections in Northern Ireland. The results of the by-elections of 1981 and the elections of 1982 were important since the PSF's triumph represented a clear erosion of the SDLP's hold on the Nationalist vote. Irvine (1991) says that the two main Unionist parties were able to obtain between them 47 seats and the Alliance 10. The SDLP had 14 members and Sinn Fein; the political wing of the Provisional IRA that participated in such an election for the first time won 5 seats and 10 per cent of the total poll. That reach was considered as a step forward to displace the SDLP as the main voice of nationalism in Ulster. M.Smith, (1995) claims that the degree of support not only increased the confidence of the Provisionals for themselves but also attracted external interest. In fact in July 1983 Gerry Adams was received in London as the guest of the leader of the Greater London Council, Ken Livingstone. Adams used this opportunity to express its cause:

he explained how the PSF was going to undermine the SDLP in order to establish a kind of republican veto. But something different occurred. “Both SDLP and Sinn Fein members refused to take their seats in the assembly, which destroyed all hopes to it achieving the desired ‘cross-community support’...it was finally dissolved in June 1986” (Irvine, 1991:129). As the popularity of the Provisionals increased the danger that the SDLP that was running for peaceful politics could be smashed and replaced by Sinn Fein appeared probable. Under these conditions, John Hume who was the leader of the SDLP, put pressure on the Irish Republic to take the initiative to determine the nationalist agenda. By the nationalist agenda it was asked from Ireland “to spell out for the first time what constitutional guarantees and institutional structures a united Ireland might offer, and to press the British government and the Unionists for some response. Out of Hume’s efforts came the New Ireland Forum (Shannon, 1985: 30)

The public sessions began on May 30, 1983 with twenty-seven members, thirteen of them from the government parties forming the coalition (eight from Fine Gael and five from Labor), nine from the Fianna Fail, and five from the SDLP were the participants. These four parties, it was claimed by the Forum, represented over 90 percent of the nationalist population and almost three-quarters of the entire population of the island. The Unionist parties and the Alliance rejected all the invitations for participation. Although political parties representing Protestant opinion were missing individuals and groups from the north made written and oral submissions to the Forum. A total of 317 written submissions were received from both parts of Ireland,

Britain, the United States, Belgium, France, and Canada. The Forum invited thirty-one individuals and groups for oral presentations. After discussing the problem, the Forum acknowledged numerous conclusions that it characterized as '*major realities*':

Existing structures and practices in Northern Ireland have failed to provide either peace, stability, or reconciliation...and the guarantee in the 1973 Northern Ireland Constitution Act that no change in constitutional status can take place without the approval of the (Unionist) majority --has in its practical application had the effect of inhibiting the dialogue necessary for political progress (Shannon, 1985: 33)...

Another point about the Irish nationalists was that they underestimated the *ethos*, the distinct identity and power of the Unionists that was defined as: "a sense of Britishness, a particular sense of Irishness, and a set of Protestant values that Unionists '*believe to be under threat from a Catholic ethos*' " (Shannon, 1985: 33)

The report, that was the final product of the Forum, was made public in May 1984. The report, with the belief that those were meeting the criteria for peace and reconciliation, suggested three possible sets of constitutional arrangements.

(1) A unitary state achieved by consent with special provisions for unionist interests and traditions; (2) a federal state in which each area would have its own parliament, with a federal legislature for matters considered appropriate; and (3) a joint authority by which the governments of Britain and Ireland would have equal responsibility for all aspects of the government of the Northern Ireland.(Irvine, 1991: 131)

The options of the report were discussed in a detailed manner in Ireland with some parties (especially by Fianna Fail) for the first option whereas other parties favored the other options. All options were rejected in Ulster. Also Mrs. Thatcher rejected them all in a press conference on 19 November 1984. After the rejection of the Forum report, publications supporting the "Irish dimension" appeared more and more in Britain. Inter-governmental meetings between London and Dublin continued and

resulted in the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) on 15 November 1985. M.Smith believes that the political victory of the PSF “in the early 1980s came as a shock to the British and Irish governments, but it spurred both governments to find more effective means of dealing with the republican political threat, the outcome being the Anglo-Irish Agreement” (1995: 188.)

Despite the Provisionals’ support for the agreement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement was seen in Provisional circles as a counter-insurgency method *-by diplomatic means-* aiming to inject a credibility to constitutional nationalists so that British rule and its interests can be stabilized for the long-run.

Dublin did not concede its claim to the six counties and unionists were guaranteed a veto against unification as long as they remained in the majority in the province ... It stressed cooperation and the joint fight against terrorism. By setting up an Inter-governmental Council both governments concede each other’s interest and responsibility in the province, but stressed that neither’s sovereignty was impinged on (Wichert, 1991: 194).

Britain gained much from this treaty since without conceding anything except accepting that the Republic has an interest on the North, it won Dublin’s support for the policy of encouraging constitutional and moderate groups to participate in the power devolvement process by negating terrorist methods. By using the threat that terrorism could spread also to the republic, Britain had regained the initiative in the province, decreased the pressure coming from the United States and showed that it could still stand up to unionists. Fraser, (2000) argued that the agreement was welcomed in the republic since it did not challenge the system or the Southern constitution while preserving the aspiration for Irish unity and permitting the North’s problem to be contained there. What is more, the Anglo-Irish treaty was successful in

putting the PIRA in a dilemma. The organization could either have chosen to protest the treaty in a violent manner and damage the success of the political branch of the organization or they could not take that path and risk to lose the political initiative that they had established in the last years.

The effects of choosing the latter course of action were soon apparent in PSF's poor showing in the January 1986 by-elections. The agreement was intended to curtail the rise in support for the PSF and secure the position of the SDLP. The tactic was successful in this respect. (Smith. M.L.R, 1995: 190).

The signing of the agreement of Hillsborough was a triumph for the SDLP but a negative response was received from the Protestants. The leader of the SDLP Hume tried to stress the issue of reconciliation.

Hume's conviction that the two cultural traditions needed to be recognised and reconciled,...differed...from the republican extremists who held unionism to be artificial and a concept which would disappear with the British presence on the island[also], since the unionist community not only did not want his kind of reconciliation but feared it as its final defeat. (Wichert, 1991: 198-199).

Wichert (1991) criticizes Hume's argument, which is portraying the '*Ulster Problem*' as solvable, if only the Protestants chose to be reasonable and rational. Wichert claims that it is based on a false assumption that Protestants want the issue to be solved in that manner. Wichert adds that the British government was in a better position compared to Hume in understanding the Unionists but those were not consulted in the process of the signing of the Agreement. The Unionists felt safe after the rejection of the New Forum report by Thatcher, thinking that they would not be forced to power-sharing experiences. This relative security ended with the shock of the AIA. Although the British government tried to reassure them "unionists saw the granting to the republic of an institutionalized channel for 'interference' in the affairs of Ulster as an unambiguous sign that Northern Ireland was being pushed out of the

United Kingdom”(Bruce, 1992: 236) After the accord was signed, various ‘*Ulster Clubs*’ were prepared for demonstrations, all Unionist Westminster MP’s resigned from their seats and finally a demonstration attended by around 200,000 people was organized in Belfast on 23 November(Fraser,2000).

In the by-elections of January 1986 Unionists increased their votes by gaining Protestant votes from the Alliance but lost one seat to SDLP. Following that on 3 March a ‘*Day of Action*’ was organized. Strikes, disruptions in commerce and communication, barricades formed by masked Loyalists and some rioting at night in Belfast were the events of that day. The OUP and DUP joined forces in order to destroy the Agreement, declined cooperation with the government if the treaty is not annulled. “The unionist protest, under the slogan ‘*Ulster Says No*’ gradually modified its demands from scrapping the Agreement to suspending it, after which, they said, they would be willing to talk to the SDLP about devolution and power sharing” (Wichert, 1991: 200)

When the Secretary of State, Tom King, refused that option, OUP and DUP could not agree on a *modus vivendi* to protest. The OUP of Molyneaux wanted to mobilize passive resistance and demonstration within the limits of law whereas the DUP under the guidance of a prominent hard line deputy, Peter Robinson (who was more prominent than Paisley himself), wanted to make the province ungovernable by the revival of the 1912 inheritance that had paralyzed the province in 1974. The difficulty to bring down the Agreement was understood by Protestants. Opposed to 1974, there

was no change in the government form and minimal physical manifestation of the AIA existed. The few existent institutions were attacked properly: the Secretary of State, the police, the administrative Secretariat at Maryfield in Belfast. Protestants finally realized that nothing had occurred that would affect them badly and that the Catholic power had not increased. “Given that the Agreement offered so little tangible focus for its opponents, the absence of an attractive substitute was possibly of disproportionate significance in the campaign’s ultimate collapse”. (Jackson, 1998: 413) So active opposition to the Agreement decreased in the end of the 1980s. As their counterparts, the Catholics, had resisted unionist rule in the twenties, Unionists had shown their disagreement to a ‘*Direct Rule from London with an Irish dimension*’ in the eighties.

Another area that did not see any progress was the cooperation between the Northern and Southern police forces. Cross-border security could not be achieved because the Garda Siochana²⁹ was neither as well equipped nor trained as the RUC nor had it institutional independence from political interference.

PIRA’s backlash against the success of the AIA meant that greater army numbers (10,000 by the end of 1988) had to be employed in particularly vulnerable areas, that is the border, mostly to interrupt cross-border armaments movements and, with help from the SAS³⁰, to prevent PIRA operations (Wichert, 1991: 196).

²⁹ Garda Siochana or Gardai (Civil Guards): The police force in the South. Established in 1923 as a (normally) unarmed force to replace the old heavily-armed RIC. The Gardai have always had an armed Special Branch however to deal with political dissent (Farrell, 1980, p. 353)

³⁰ Special Air Services Regiment (SAS) and Military Reaction Force (MRF): The SAS is a highly-secret crack unit of the British Army. Set up during the Second World War it has been for plain-clothes, counter insurgency and special operations work in a number of countries...After many denials Westminster finally admitted that SAS personnel were active in Northern Ireland, though still denying that they operated as SAS units. The MRF consists of armed plain-clothes squads patrolling in

The British government increased its pressure upon the organization in 1988 by the ban on broadcasting for members of prohibited organizations and supporters of violence. Declarations of renunciation of violence from candidates in local elections were brought as a requirement. M.Smith (1995) stated that those restrictions created a fear on the Provisionals of political marginalization. What is more, the Provisionals' anxiety increased after the Anglo-Irish agreements. The feeling of isolation pushed Provisionals to begin a formal dialogue with the SDLP, in January 1988 in order to form a pressure group that would force the Irish government to use diplomatic ways to secure national self-determination. SDLP made clear that for cooperation with PSF, the PIRA should end its violent campaign. The inability of PSF to control the PIRA proved the ambiguities that existed in the Provisional tradition.

The worst possible outcome was obtained in the 1992 elections since a declined political base showed to the entire world that PIRA was fighting its war on a minority definition of nationalism. The PSF lost in the elections of 1992. Gerry Adams lost his seat of West Belfast. After the losses when in March 1992, Gerry Adams spoke that the *'ballot box in one hand and the armalite in the other'* being an *'outdated' slogan*, people thought that a shift in republican thought was realized. The reason behind that speech was something else however. The PSF was excluded from the talks, which started on 30 April 1991 at Stormont because of its rejection to condemn the PIRA violence. The talks were going on between individual political parties and Peter

unmarked cars or under cover of apparently legitimate businesses. MRF squads admitted responsibility for killing two unarmed Catholic civilians in 1972 and have been accused of killing several more. (Farrell, 1980: 361)

Brooke, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. It was the first try after the 1973 Sunningdale conference to start cross-party negotiations. The target of the Provisionals to form a common nationalist front was reached after the Hume-Adams talks started in April 1993. The contents of the Hume-Adams dialogue were revealed to the Irish government on 7 October 1993. The participants never made the details public but it was thought that some proposals were formulated so that the Provisionals would renounce violence. After those events the belief that the promises would be kept appeared realizable for a while. Adams declared his willingness to take the proposals from his talks with Hume to the PIRA by recommending the organization to review the continuation of the armed struggle. Adams was projected as a man of peace in the global agenda after contacts with John Hume. But the optimism did not last long. After the Shankill bombing of PIRA that killed 10 persons in October 1993, reports of press claiming that a series of secret talks were pursued, appeared in the press, in late November 1993. The first acknowledgement of the existence of the secret talks came from the Provisionals who became furious when John Major at a speech claimed that PSF could enter into dialogue with the British government if PIRA agreed to end violence permanently.

As public pressure increased after the news of the secret talks, the British and Irish governments decided to take political initiative on the issue. On 15 December 1993 the Downing Street declaration was made public. The declaration was made in order to cover the embarrassment that the British had felt after the secret talks. Secondly, it was done in order to counteract against the Hume-Adams initiative. Thirdly, despite

the inconclusiveness in the secret talks the aim was to induce the IRA to stop violence. Adam's interpretation on the Downing Street declaration of 1993 was:

a slow and painful process of England's disengagement from her first and last colony, Ireland. It may be a small step, as was the Hillsborough Agreement of 1985 which...gave Dublin, for the first time, 'a foot in the door' in the six counties (M. Smith, 1995: 226)

Jackson argued that the Hume-Adams process re-energized the British-Irish *détente*, with the crafting of first the Downing Street Declaration (November 1993) and the Framework Document (February 1995) (1998:413).

The IRA violence continued till the 31 August 1994 ceasefire when PIRA declared an unconditional and indefinite ceasefire. The loyalist community understood the ceasefire as the result of a secret deal to pressure unionists into accepting a united Ireland. The event that increased their suspicion was that the British government signaled that it was making a change over the section 75 of *the 1920 Government of Ireland Act*

Section 75 of the Act asserted the Westminster parliament's supreme authority over Northern Ireland. The government indicated that it was prepared to replace section 75 with a clause allowing a change in the status of Northern Ireland if a majority of the province so wanted...Although nationalist demanded revisions to the 1920 Act, nevertheless amending section 75 would, in effect, be a rather meaningless formality and could hardly be represented as a sign of a secret deal with the Provisionals, symptomatic of British backsliding on the union. (M. Smith, 1995: 213)

After the meeting of Albert Reynolds, the Irish Prime Minister, in Dublin with Gerry Adams, John Hume on 6 September the Combined Loyalist Military Command replied by announcing the end of its '*operational hostilities*' on 13 October 1994 with the sole condition that the nationalist would not return to violence. "With republican

and loyalist ceasefires in place, the way seemed clear for substantive political progress, though no one doubted the chasms of distrust which would have to be bridged”(Fraser, 2000: 74).

A governmental crisis in the Irish republic that changed the president Albert Reynolds with a new Fine Gael–labor coalition led by John Burton government affected the peace process since it was not until 22 February 1995 that Major and Burton revealed their ‘*Frameworks for the Future*’. It was formed with the intention to set an agenda for political discussions. *The first Framework* envisaged a parliament of 90 members elected by proportional representation from which legislative decisions would require a weighted majority. *The second Framework* suggested joint institutions of the North–South which would have executive, consultative and harmonizing functions.

Executive functions might extend to: sectors involving a natural or physical all–Ireland framework; European Union programmes and initiatives...Harmonizing functions included: aspects of agriculture and fisheries; industrial development ...The Consultative role of the North–South body would be to exchange information about ‘existing and future policy’ with a view to ‘common or agreed positions (Fraser, 2000: 75)

Unionist suspicion about the all–Ireland institutions could not be allayed although Major and Mayhew gave those assurances. Two important issues were blocking the way to progress. One was the decommissioning of paramilitary arms. The British government and the Unionists wanted the decommissioning of the IRA weapons and warned the Sinn Fein not to include it in the all–party talks. The Sinn Fein leaders tried to show that decommissioning of the IRA would mean surrender and that the Sinn Fein and IRA were separate organizations. The second problem was the issue of parading. By 1995 it was a big problem. That year 3, 500 took place compared to

2,120 in 1985. Parades were creating confrontations on certain routes where the population had become nationalist as a result of population movement. The most famous place of confrontation was Portadown as events happened also on 9 July 1995. On 8 September 1995 James Molyneaux, whose political base had been undermined by the Framework documents announced his resignation and was replaced by David Trimble. On 28 November an agreement was reached between Major and Bruton for the establishment of an international body to be chaired by the former American Senator George Mitchell in order to report the arms decommissioning process Bertie Ahern. Pruitt, (2000) believes that the third-party intervention model was used in dealing with the Northern Ireland issue. That is a communication chain formed in secrecy in which all the negotiations are done in privacy. The third party arranges for the disputants to meet, tries to improve relationship, or at least transmits messages between them. As a mediator he/she undertakes to structure the agenda, suggest new ways of looking at issues and possible solutions. Finally...a mediator may threaten, bribe, or otherwise pressure disputants to make concessions and seek compromise³¹.

Two days later the president of the U.S.A visited the region to show its optimism about the peace process. On 9 February 1996, the IRA ended the ceasefire after 17 months of silence, showing that political progress was remote. Elections that were held on 30 May to create a forum didn't yield productive results since, as the ceasefire was ended, the Sinn Fein was not admitted to participate in the forum and the SDLP

³¹ Secrecy is facilitated by communicating through chains of intermediaries, and has the great advantage of providing political cover and deniability to the main disputants...This is especially advantageous in severe ethnic conflicts in which direct talks...appear to grant legitimacy to the adversary...All negotiations must be private...otherwise, negotiators...become overly committed to their initial positions. One more point...chains that work well and produce results tend to become shorter in the long-run, with intermediaries dropping out and parties at or near the ends of the chains meeting each other directly. See Pruitt, Dean G. 2000.*The Tactics of Third Party Intervention*.

stopped attending in September. In the summer of 1996, serious riots occurred in North Ireland in the season of the parades. On 1 May 1997, Tony Blair's Labour party formed the government. As the parade season approached tension was increasing once again.

On 10 July, to an almost universal sense of relief, the Orange Order announced that its four most contentious parades would not take place. The remaining Orange parades on 12 July proceeded virtually without incident. That Northern Ireland had passed a point of crisis became clearer 10 days later when the IRA announced the renewal of its ceasefire (Fraser, 2000: 78.)

Negotiations that regrouped all parts of the Northern Ireland conflict re-started under the leadership of Mitchell and finally were concluded on 10 April 1998, Good Friday, after the personal involvement of Tony Blair and his counterpart. According to the treaty:

The basis of the Union was set firmly on consent; this was seen both as a guarantee to unionists and a confirmation to nationalists that Britain had no other interest in Northern Ireland. The formula enabled Sinn Féin to see the Agreement as a transitional phase to Irish unity...The Agreement set out new principles for the internal government of Northern Ireland through a 108-member Assembly, elected by proportional representation. Governmental responsibilities would be allocated to party strength in the Assembly and mechanisms were set in place to ensure that key decisions would have cross-party support. (Fraser, 2000: 79.)

A referendum was held on 2 May in Northern Ireland and the treaty was accepted by 71.2 of the electorate. Despite the Agreement tensions within the community remained high.

On the referendum, held on 8 June 2001, the Irish people rejected the enlargement of the European Union by voting against the Nice Treaty (James, 2001). At the same time another election was held in Ulster. On 7 June 2001 the Protestant population

showed its anger of sharing power with Sinn Fein. The Orangist David Trimble, who was at the head of the power-sharing government till 1 July, resigned from his office because of the pressures coming from his community since IRA had not started the decommissioning of arms (Claude, 2001a). On 13th of July violent demonstrations, which injured several police officers, created suspicions. It was believed demonstrations were orchestrated by the PIRA in order to show London the necessity to reform the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which was constituted of 93% of Protestants (Claude, 2000b). Finally a group of dissidents, called the Real IRA, opposing the peace process, exploded a bomb in Omagh's town center killing 29 people. Last of the events or incidents committed by the REAL IRA is a bomb that had exploded on 3 August 2001 near a London subway station giving serious harm to seven people (? , 2001). Negotiations about the decommissioning of arms continue, after the demission of David Trimble. Later IRA on August 14 announced that it wont continue the disarmament process in a time when everyone had believed that the police system will be reformed and IRA that has halted the thirty years war will make the last step to end the armed conflict.

The period between 1970's till our days has been shaken by major changes. Those can be shortly given as the structural changes that the Republic of Ireland has made. Second, was the entrance of Ireland with Britain to the European Community. That event created a rapprochement between Britain in material terms as well as relations improved in matters of economic as well as political issues. The rapprochement has led to various attempts to find solution for the Northern Ireland crisis. The attempts to

find some solutions was resisted mostly by Protestant lower classes and Catholics who were afraid to be sold out to the British occupation. Fierce resistance was developed by Catholics who used the political as well as the military option to reflect their grievances and impose on the British state, that was seen as culpable, to find a solution to the issue. Protestants on the other hand, used the same methods to resist the treaties signed by the English and Irish states such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 or the Downing Street Declaration of 1993. Nowadays the Good Friday agreement is dealt with parties in Ireland. The major issues that remained unsolved were the disarmament of the IRA and the reformulation of the Ulster policing forces on an equalitarian basis.

CONCLUSION

The Irish conflict is rooted in the earlier English presence that has created an Irish colony-state. The presence of settlers and the monopolization of resources such as the most fertile lands that were confiscated from the Catholics and given to the few approved persons make the issue an economic matter. It is also cultural since the requirement of being a member of the dominant religion to acquire status is important. It is also social since the migration of societies has fueled the struggle for valuable lands and has given superiority to the owners of those goods.

The English have colonized Ireland by taking most valuable places; secondly they have forced the native populations to migrate from the fertile agricultural areas. Later they have tried to incorporate the conquered lands to London. Faced with challenge, they provoked sectarian tensions and utilized violence to subdue Catholics. Also they have granted some privileges to Protestant poor classes by taking them to the yeomanry, to protect landlords' farms.

When the merchants of Ireland faced the protectionary walls of England, they with the help of the Landlords, tried to challenge the center by forgetting the sectarian issues that were separating them. When the core (England) offered with the Act of Union (1801) some possibilities to the development of an indigenous industry, the elites accepted the continuation of British rule. An uneven development theorist would

suggest that the elites were given some privileges and in return they offered the country to England.

Another point is about the development of the industry in a colonial setting, where specialization in some issues is required as Hechter would argue. The proof of that is the development of a linen industry and later a shipping industry that became the best in all British production areas.

The increase in production led to Catholic immigration to the Belfast area since other areas became poorer after the Act of Union. When they arrived to industrial areas, they faced violence from the Protestant lower classes since those saw them as a threat as it is suggested by the Split Labor theory.

As O'Sullivan would argue the competition for resources increases the probability of ethnic violence. The first sectarian rioting appeared in those years when perceptual explanations were used against the Catholics. When the Catholics faced violence, they realized the reason of being unsuccessful was that the Protestants governed them. So they started the quest for a new state. Since security was missing for them within the existing state, they tried to free themselves with 'Home Rule'. The proprietors of the lands were disturbed and riots reappeared in industrial settings.

Later the elites of the Protestants appealed to the masses to tell how important is the creation of a Protestant state. Brown would consider that situation with domestic

explanations about the size of the group and the systemic explanations on the security dilemma that shapes the events. The fear from the larger group that, if acquired the means, can subdue them and British assistance led the Protestants to form a state for themselves.

As Bartkus would say, the First World War opened a window of opportunity for the Catholics who obtained the prospect to liberate themselves from the oppressor. The same can be applied to Protestant elites that used another window of opportunity, the Civil war, to create or to consolidate their own state. Ireland also used the windows of opportunity by first obtaining the status of dominion in the World War I, later, in exchange of remaining neutral in the World War II gained independence. The president de Valera opted for exit (independence) from the former autonomy status in its relations with Britain.

Protestants in their own states were able to apply systematic discrimination to Catholics, by strengthening their dominant *ethos* of Protestantism, to make viable a microstate that could not exist without that.

The aspiration of Ireland of uniting with Ulster was unrealistic since Ulster had been able to solidify itself on its territory. The existence of ethnic based political parties that dominated the political sphere was the proof of “the tyranny of the majority” argued Brown (1993), an environment in which minorities remain constantly powerless in the political sphere and in which case they are forced to use weapons.

The World War II era, called as the decolonization period, saw the emergence of numerous states in the international scene that used the nationalist rhetoric of self-determination. The UN General assembly adopted on December 14, 1960 the resolution no: 1514, which paved the way for colonies to free themselves from oppressors. Later the principles of 'self-determination' and 'sovereignty' clashed with the principle of 'territorial integrity' since major powers have showed their disagreement of the implementation of the resolution to non-colonial settings.

The civil rights movements, which changed the racial policies of the United States of America by employing peaceful, non-violent methods of showing disagreement to political systems, were also used in Ulster. The Catholic minority applied the same methods but faced the violent methods of the Ulster policing forces and the Orange Order members. The state did not discuss the options that Gurr(2000) claimed to exist. That situation put the IRA as the sole alternative.

Meanwhile in the Southern state the events that Buchanan (1998) speculates happened. Protestants living in the South became a minority of 10% of the Southern population after the secession of Ulster. Although the Irish Republic didn't explicitly pressure the minority, it fell to 3% of the whole population of the Republic of Ireland. This trend helped to legitimize the perceptual explanations of radical Protestant leaders of the North of being erased by the Catholic majority, if unification is realized some day.

The policies of the new prime minister of Ireland, Lemass differed from his predecessors. He tried to open the Catholic state to the outside world by focusing development rather than trying to solve the Northern Ireland problem. Those policies set the way for Terence O'Neill and Sean Lemass; the two prime ministers of the Irish states came together in 1965. The Sunningdale conference, which ended with an agreement suggesting devolution of power to Northern Ireland was inapplicable since the power-sharing executive failed to govern the country when grass-roots demonstrations supplemented by paramilitaries, plagued the country and blocked the implementation of the treaty. The fear to loose their comparative advantage against the Catholics led the Protestant working class to rise and demonstrate. In that case too the competition for resources resulted with the deception and fear of Catholics to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

The period between the 1970's till the end of 90's has seen important changes. Those were the structural changes of the Republic of Ireland. Also admittance of Ireland with Britain to the European Community created a rapprochement between Britain and Ireland in matters of economic as well as political issues. This led to various attempts to find solutions for the Northern Ireland crisis. The attempts were resisted mostly by the Protestant lower classes who were afraid to be sold out to the Catholic rule. Catholics also developed fierce resistance, using the political as well as the military option, to reflect their discontent and to force the British state to find a solution to the issue. Protestants on the other hand used the same methods to resist the treaties signed by the English and Irish states such as the Anglo-Irish Agreement of

1985 or the Downing Street Declaration of 1993. The Good Friday agreement that was accepted in April 1998 is still dealt in Ireland. The major issues, which remained unsolved, were the disarmament of the IRA and the reformulation of the Ulster policing forces on an equalitarian basis.

Accordingly, the main argument of the thesis was the persistence of an ethnic conflict in a first world. For that issue major theories were viewed and some were found relevant in certain contexts. But the major failure was that of the Modernization theory which was unable to account for the “First World Nationalisms”.

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
Wagstaff, Peter. 1994. *Regionalism in Europe*. Peter Wagstaff, ed. Oxford :Intellect
Books.



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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A:—Maps about the Immigration / Colonization Period.






APPENDIX B : Actual Northern Ireland




APPENDIX C : Protestants in Ireland

The declining Protestant population in the Republic of Ireland,* 1891 to 1991




*For the period before 1921, these figures are for the 26 counties that later constituted the Republic of Ireland.

Unlike the rest of this site, this chart is declared to be in the public domain.




Unlike the rest of this site, this map is declared to be in the public domain.


APPENDIX D : Elections in Northern Ireland



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The "Greening of the West" - Northern Ireland General Elections in 1997 and 2001



This map created for the Ireland Story. It may be used elsewhere provided a link is given to www.irelandstory.com, the site is non-profit and the map is not modified.